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ABSTRACT 
This study focuses on Nepal’s historical contribution to United Nations 
peacekeeping missions and identifies an empirical puzzle: Nepal suffers from unstable 
civil-military relations (CMR) at home, even as it supports UN peace efforts with large 
peacekeeping deployments. This finding is counterintuitive because the conventional 
wisdom on CMR argues that participation in international peacekeeping operations 
promotes stable CMR by making young soldiers more cosmopolitan, less nationalistic, 
and more resistant to calls for military “salvation” via coups in times of crisis. This work 
traces the policy-making process on peacekeeping issues, including the role of the foreign 
ministry and the military establishment, and analyses the evolution of CMR in Nepal.  
The study finds that while peacekeeping has provided valuable international experiences 
to Nepal’s armed forces, the benefits of such an engagement are withheld due to its weak 
political institutional framework and constant political crises. The armed forces’ focus is 
still dominated by the domestic context, while civilians pay little attention to foreign 
policy and peacekeeping matters. Both trends—a military focus on domestic stability and 
civilian apathy towards defense and foreign policy—help explain why CMR in Nepal are 
inherently unstable despite its military involvement in peacekeeping duties abroad. 
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I. INTRODUCTION AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. INTRODUCTION  
Civil-military relations (CMR) focuses on the relation between civil society and 
military organizations in broad terms; specifically, it is the relations between the military 
and the civil authority of a country. Civil-military relations are categorized according to 
their nature, and differing environments and interactions between civilian authorities and 
the military result in differing outcomes. 
The range of explanations available in CMR theory includes subjective and 
objective control of the armed forces. Analyzing various theories and modalities leads to 
the conclusion that "one size does not fit all." Professionalism and principal-agent 
paradigms offer appropriate models for explaining CMR in advanced democracies where 
sophisticated democratic institutions are in place. In contrast, CMR in authoritarian or 
non-democratic countries may be best described as subjective civilian control. However, 
this generalization is not sacrosanct.  
International approaches to CMR suggest that peacekeeping is a tool to promote 
healthy CMR by providing externally oriented roles or missions for the armed forces.1 
Indeed, while many countries have taken part in United Nations (UN) peacekeeping 
missions since their origin in 1948, the reality is that not all peacekeeping contributors 
enjoy good CMR. Peacekeeping has positively affected the CMR of some countries, 
while other countries have yet to experience similar effects.  
Likewise, peacekeeping missions serve the foreign policy goals of troop 
contributing nations. Although the ultimate aim of any peacekeeping mission is to 
establish international peace and order, the political leaders of troop contributing 
countries also seek to utilize international forums to achieve their countries' national 
interests. Therefore, peacekeeping is a foreign policy tool. Contributing troops to 
                                                 
1 Michael C. Desch, Civilian Control of the Military: The Changing Security Environment (Baltimore: 
John Hopkins University Press, 2001). Desch focuses on the missions and roles of the armed forces, and 
asserts that an externally oriented military will have less inclination to participate in domestic politics. 
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peacekeeping missions is an intrinsic element of any nation's foreign policy. Master 
strategist Carl Von Clausewitz argues that war is a means to achieve political ends. 
Similarly, troop contributors seek to achieve foreign policy goals through the deployment 
of blue helmet troops. 
For this reason, it is necessary to investigate whether participation in UN 
peacekeeping missions contributes to improving CMR and achieving foreign policy goals 
among troop contributing nations. Observations from the field indicate that peacekeeping 
may have mixed results, with some but not all countries improving their CMR.  This 
raises questions about causality for most CMR and international relations theories, which 
often assume a positive relationship between peacekeeping engagement and civilian 
control.  
B. RESEARCH QUESTION 
Identifying why and how peacekeeping contributes to improving CMR in 
authoritarian and democratizing states provides insights to better understand civilian 
control and CMR. According to conventional wisdom, peacekeeping improves CMR by 
providing military personnel with civilian tasks, thus closely integrating the armed forces 
with civilians in the field.2 However, the Nepalese case is somewhat different. In addition 
to its major role of protecting the country from external and internal threats, the Nepalese 
Army (NA) has substantially contributed to UN peacekeeping missions for more than 
fifty years. Unfortunately, this long and profound contribution to UN peacekeeping 
missions has not paid off by improving CMR, nor has it contributed to advancing the 
nation's foreign policy agenda.  
Therefore, the research puzzle addressed in this study is to understand why a 
country, in this case Nepal, has unstable CMR when its military has an externally 
oriented mission, namely peacekeeping. The study focuses on explaining why Nepal 
                                                 
2 Conventional wisdom suggests that an externally oriented military, in this case international 
peacekeeping, will have less inclination to participate in domestic politics, thereby improving civil-military 
relations. See Desch. 
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deviates from the conventional wisdom in CMR theory, and specifically, why Nepal's 
CMR seem so unstable even though its armed forces have an externally oriented mission.  
C. IMPORTANCE 
The subject matter of this study is important because one strand of the CMR 
literature argues that countries with externally oriented military institutions tend to have 
stable CMR, but Nepal does not seem to fit this model, leading to questions about both 
the theory and about Nepal as a case study. The Nepalese case is also relevant because it 
pinpoints the importance of roles and missions in CMR, especially vis-à-vis civilian 
control. This case study is also justified because peacekeeping is supposed to be a foreign 
policy tool; yet, it seems to have had unintended consequences inside Nepal. Finally, the 
case provides information about how peacekeeping affects military institutions, 
especially among developing states.  If, as Charles C. Moskos argues, the military is more 
integrated with civilians when it performs peacekeeping, then why do we see civil-
military instability among developing countries that perform peacekeeping operations? 3 
This study focuses on the relationship between the armed forces' roles and 
democratic stability in Nepal, especially in relation to the military's involvement in 
peacekeeping. Nepal has taken part in UN peacekeeping missions since 1958. The NA 
has contributed peacekeepers to different missions spanning a wide spectrum of 
peacekeeping operations all over the world.4 Yet Nepal continues to be unstable in terms 
of CMR. Instability here refers to instances in which the military has not followed 
civilian preferences, either neglecting civilian orders or imposing their own policy 
preferences on their principals.  
                                                 
3 Charles C. Moskos, John Allen Williams and David R. Segal, The Postmodern Military: Armed 
Forces after the Cold War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000). 
4 Nepalese Army in UNPKO, Nepalese Army Web site, http://www.nepalarmy.mil.np/na_un.php, 




The hypothesis of this thesis is that any improvement in CMR is conditional on 
the existence of political will, interests, and active involvement for overarching 
peacekeeping issues, without which the CMR of troop lending countries does not 
improve. For this purpose, the thesis focuses on a controlled case comparison of Nepal, a 
country that has participated extensively on UN peacekeeping yet has recently suffered 
various CMR crises.   
This study focuses on three sets of arguments.  The first argument is that 
peacekeeping provides an external role for the armed forces, which ultimately allows 
civilians to exercise control by keeping the forces away from domestic politics.5 This 
argument, drawn from diversionary theories, is based on the assumption that roles and 
mission determine outcomes in defense policy.  
The second argument claims that peacekeeping allows for increased levels of 
integration between civilian and military components, thus allowing for the 
civilianization of the armed forces themselves.6 This argument is drawn from the field of 
military sociology and is based on the assumption that socialization often shapes policy 
preferences and even identities.  
Finally, the third argument is drawn from Samuel P. Huntington's argument in 
Political Order in Changing Society.  It argues that CMR tend to be weak among states 
lacking strong political institutions, such as parties and military organizations.7 
Moreover, the absence of a strong political institution affects military loyalties and 
leadership, leading to political instability and military coups. 
                                                 
5 Desch, Civilian Control of the Military, 2001. 
6 Moskos, Williams and Segal, The Postmodern Military: Armed Forces after the Cold War, 3, 9. 
7 Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
196), 8. 
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E. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This literature review focuses on different approaches to CMR: Desch’s approach 
to military roles, Moskos’ analysis of the post-modern military, and Huntington’s 
approach to political parties in changing societies. 
Desch, following Huntington’s argument on civilian control,8 focuses on missions 
and roles. He asserts, "An externally oriented military will have less inclination to 
participate in domestic politics" because all of the state power, including the military, will 
have to be focused externally.9 International security threats are likely to provide more 
power and support to knowledgeable and experienced civilian leadership because civilian 
institutions tend to be more cohesive and the military is more likely to unify from 
potential or actual factions when the source of threat is external. Under such 
circumstances, civilian leaders are more likely to exercise objective civilian control, 
relying on military competency to fight a war against an external enemy.  
Desch argues that there are many causes for stable or unstable CMR. First, the 
individual personalities, character and experience of civilian and military leaders affect 
CMR. Second, the level of civilian control depends on institutional changes in the 
military, such as changes in the level of unity, organizational culture, or professionalism. 
Third, the level of civilian control of the military also depends on the changes in the 
civilian institutions of the government. Fourth, weak state institutions are less effective in 
exerting civilian control. Fifth, the level of civilian control depends on the method of 
civilian control. For instance, according to Huntington, objective control is more 
conducive to effective civilian control than is subjective control. Sixth, civilian control of 
the military is likely to be weak when there are sharp differences in opinion and culture 
between the military and the civilian sphere. Lastly, changes in the international 
environment are likely to affect the CMR, but how they affect the domestic order is 
subject to dispute.10 
                                                 
8 Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military 
Relations. (Belknap: Harvard, 1957). 
9 Desch, Civilian Control of the Military, 14. 
10 Desch, Civilian Control of the Military, 8–10. 
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Desch considers the aforementioned individual, military, state and societal 
variables as intervening variables that respond to domestic and international threats, thus 
determining the level of civilian control. He argues, "The strength of civilian control of 
the military in most countries is shaped fundamentally by structural factors, especially 
threats, which affect individual leaders, the military organization, the state, and society." 
He classifies threats, his independent variable, as internal and external.     
It is extremely difficult to reorient the military of new democratic states, thus 
making improvement in their CMR less likely. However, external powers such as the 
U.S. can play an important role in improving the CMR of newly democratic states by 
providing military assistance to focus the attention of the armed forces on external 
missions.11  
Morris Janowitz asserts that the technological and organizational revolutions have 
narrowed the gap between the military and civilians. As a result, civilians have heavily 
influenced the military profession. He puts forward the constabulary model, which 
eliminates the concept of peacetime and wartime military. Drawing on the police concept, 
the constabulary model advocates subjective control because of integration with civilian 
values and self-imposed professional standards.  
Janowitz maintains, "The constabulary concept provides continuity with past 
military experiences and traditions, but it also offers a basis for the radical adaptation of 
the profession. The military establishment becomes a constabulary force when it is 
continuously prepared to act, committed to the minimum use of force."12 During the post-
war period, the British forces used this concept to maintain the political stability of the 
members of the British Commonwealth and associate states. 
Moskos, following Janowitz, argues in favor of an integration approach, and 
believes the line separating the military and civilians is slowly disappearing. He notes, 
"Peacekeeping and humanitarian missions have come to occupy a more central position 
                                                 
11 Desch, Civilian Control of the Military, 122. 
12 Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier, A Social and Political Portrait (Glencoe: Free Press, 
1960), 418. 
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in military doctrine than ever before."13 He recognizes that since the end of the Cold War 
there has been increased permeability between civil and military structures, eroding 
traditional military values. This leads to major changes in military institutions and 
CMR.14 For instance, in analyzing Canada through this lens, Moskos asserts that 
The [Canadian] armed forces themselves have been increasingly 
democratized, liberalized, and civilianized...A high value is placed on 
military integration with the larger society and transparency of the civil-
military interface...The dominant professional roles in the Canadian 
military are becoming the soldier-diplomat and corporate manager.15 
In Peace Soldiers, Moskos explores the sociological aspects of peacekeepers vis-
à-vis their military organization and professionalism, dignity and loyalty.  He writes, "To 
the degree that a peacekeeping force deemphasizes the application of violence in order to 
attain viable political compromises, such a peacekeeping force approaches the 
constabulary model of military forces proposed by Janowitz."16 The constabulary model 
advocates the measured and minimum use of force to achieve political solutions. From 
this perspective, peacekeepers seek to use force only in self-defense. In this sense, peace 
soldiers can be viewed as a strict version of the constabulary model. 
Moskos claims that the constabulary ethic demonstrated by peacekeepers is 
directly proportional to the internationalism that they display.17 He says, 
Conventional military professionalism entails loyalty to the nation-state, 
expert command of lethal weaponry, and a willingness to employ that 
weaponry for chauvinistic purposes; peacekeeping professionalism 
requires internationalist identification, proficiency in non-coercive 
measures, and performance of mission in an impartial cause. Where 
military professionals are expert warriors serving national interest, 
peacekeeping professionals are an impartial and internationally 
legitimated constabulary.18 
                                                 
13 Moskos, Williams and Segal, The Postmodern Military, 3. 
14 Moskos, Williams and Segal, The Postmodern Military, 6. 
15 Moskos, Williams and Segal, The Postmodern Military, 9. 
16 Charles C. Moskos, Jr., Peace Soldiers: The Sociology of a United Nations Military Force (Chicago:  
University of Chicago Press, 1976),  
17 Moskos, Peace Soldiers, 9. 
18 Moskos, Peace Soldiers, 10. 
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Regular armed forces focus on the achievement of victory even if it requires the 
maximum use of violence, and pay less attention to non-military considerations. In 
contrast, peacekeepers are determined to achieve peace, even relinquishing some military 
principles and procedures. Peace soldiers are the extreme manifestation of the 
constabulary ethic that favors persuasion, compromise and capitulation over punishment, 
perseverance and conquest. Moskos further asserts,  
Even peacekeeping service itself, moreover, was typically interpreted as 
serving national military purposes: the opportunity for operational 
deployment in an overseas environment, the acquisition of experience in 
multinational military cooperation, and a rationale for an armed forces 
establishment to counter antimilitary domestic opinion.19 
Huntington’s emphasis on political parties and their role in facilitating political 
order and civilian control of the armed forces provides a third theoretical perspective. 
Huntington argues, "The most important cause of military intervention in politics are not 
military but political and reflect not the social and organizational characteristics of the 
military establishment, but the political and institutional structure of the society."20 
From this third perspective, the problem of civilian control in chaotic political 
situations does not rest primarily on the military. Military intervention in politics is thus 
one of the various forms of social interactions that takes place among praetorian societies 
and cannot be readily explained by narrow military explanations. Huntington emphasizes 
how weak political institutions attract military intervention in underdeveloped societies. 
In all societies specialized social groups engage in politics. What makes 
such groups seem more "politicized" in a praetorian society is the absence 
of effective political institutions capable of mediating, refining, and 
moderating group political action. In a praetorian system social forces 
confront each other nakedly; no political institutions, no corps of 
professional political leaders are recognized or accepted as the legitimate 
intermediaries to moderate group conflict.21 
                                                 
19 Moskos, Peace Soldiers,138. 
20 Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies,194. 
21 Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, 192. 
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According to Huntington, in a praetorian society, power is divided into various 
forms and small numbers because of the lack of effective political institutions. For 
instance, the power may take the form of oligarchy, popular demagogue, or small 
political parties or factions ready to "sell out." The level of politicization of military 
institutions and individuals depends upon the weaknesses of political institutions and the 
inability of the political leaders to address the primary problems of the country.22 
Huntington argues, 
As society changes, so does the role of the military. In the world of 
oligarchy, the soldier is a radical; in the middle-class world, he is a 
participant and arbiter; as the mass society looms on the horizon, he 
becomes the conservative guardian of the existing order.23 
Thomas C. Bruneau advocates for "new-institutionalism" and asserts that control 
of the military by democratic institutions, as well as effectiveness and efficiency, is 
necessary for stable CMR.  Indeed, an effective peacekeeping contribution requires an 
equally active defense ministry.24 The absence of a capable ministry of defense explains 
the weakness in institutionalizing civilian control in Nepal. The four core areas where a 
ministry of defense should be efficient are budget, personnel, acquisitions, and definition 
of roles and missions.25 Since the civilian leadership at the Ministry of Defense continues 
to be weak, peacekeeping in Nepal is largely a military operation, with little or no 
diplomatic feedback. Consequently, there is no support for the military by the political 
leadership, allowing the military to preserve its traditional institutional autonomy. Given 
that there is no diplomatic feedback, Nepal has little diplomatic leeway negotiating with 
the UN and other major peacekeeping actors, such as India. 
The thesis also relies on the literature on peacekeeping and CMR. It is widely 
believed that participation in peacekeeping operations will have a positive impact on the 
                                                 
22 Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, 196–221. 
23 Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, 221. 
24 Thomas C. Bruneau and Richard B. Goetze, Jr, "Ministries of Defense and Democratic Control," 
Who Guards the Guardians and How: Democratic Civil-Military Relations (Texas: University of Texas 
Press, 2006), 81. 
25 Bruneau and Goetze, Who Guards the Guardians and How, 83. 
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CMR of troop contributing countries. A good number of studies suggest that 
peacekeeping participation has in fact helped to improve CMR. For instance, Deborah L. 
Norden believes that the military faces serious challenges when a country transitions 
from an authoritarian rule to democracy. By taking part in UN missions, peacekeeping 
not only contributes to normalizing CMR at home, but also plays a significant role in the 
government's foreign policy. Norden asserts, "The military's participation in 
peacekeeping allowed the armed forces to become a valuable player in the government's 
foreign policy, bringing praise and recognition, where they had previously found 
disdain."26 Following this line of logic, Desch suggests that new democracies adopt an 
externally oriented defensive doctrine to achieve civilian control of military at home. He 
argues, "The Argentine government, in an effort to keep the country's once internally 
oriented military externally focused, has recently been having the military participate in 
international peacekeeping missions. This is a realist and beneficial post-Cold War 
military missions."27 
Drawing heavily from Janowitz's constabulary concept, Moskos explores a 
sociological aspect of peacekeeping vis-à-vis their military organization, and claims that 
the extreme ramification of the constabulary ethic inculcates persuasion, compromise, 
and perseverance rather than use of force and conquest in military. As Moskos argues, 
"In contrast with standard armed forces, the constabulary and peace soldiers are 
concerned with the attainment of viable political compromises rather than with the 
resolution of conflict through force."28 
However, Arturo C. Sotomayor believes that the level of military prerogatives at 
home and the nature of social interactions in missions can negatively affect the CMR of 
troop contributing countries. He argues that "domestic factors (such as different types of 
military prerogatives and divergent forms of bureaucratic decision-making process) and  
 
                                                 
26 Deborah L. Norden, "Keeping the Peace, Outside and In: Argentina's UN Missions," International 
Peacekeeping, Vol. 2, No. 3, Autumn 1995, 347. 
27 Desch, Civilian Control of the Military, 122. 
28 Moskos, Peace Soldiers, 130. 
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external variables (such as dissimilar forms of social interaction in peace operations) can 
influence the potential effects of participation in peace operations on civilian control of 
the military."29 
F. METHODOLOGY AND STRUCTURE 
This study seeks to demonstrate that Nepalese CMR has not improved despite the 
armed forces' externally oriented missions, specifically UN peacekeeping missions. This 
outcome is the result of a lack of political interests in Nepalese peacekeeping efforts. The 
argument is tested using a qualitative single case study, as well as comparative case study 
methods. The two-step approach enables the author to find the correlation between 
political interests and the level of CMR in Nepalese peacekeeping participation and to 
compare it with other nations to test the validity of the hypothesis. 
The methodology adopted for this thesis is a case study approach focused on 
Nepal as a deviant case that does not fully adjust to the existing or conventional literature.  
It focuses on multiple observations of a single case with divergent outcomes in CMR. 
The thesis analyzes Nepal in different political periods, allowing examination multiple 
observations across time and thus encompassing some internal variations. The thesis uses 
qualitative analysis to determine the nature of the CMR during four critical periods: the 
first democratic period, from 1950 through 1960; the authoritarian Panchyat period, from 
1961 through 1989; the second democratic period, from 1990 through 2006; and the third 
democratic period, from 2006 through April 2009. The four periods are determined by 
the nature of Nepal’s political system at each time. This approach offers a number of 
methodological advantages. Dividing a single case into multiple periods increases the 
number of observations within the study. 
Although Nepal began participating in UN peacekeeping missions in 1958, the 
entire first democratic period, 1950-1960, is analyzed because during this time, Nepalese 
political leaders sought an internationalist approach by involving the military in the UN. 
                                                 
29 Arturo C. Sotomayor, “Unintended Consequences of Peace Operations for Troop-Contributing 
Countries in South America: The Cases of Argentina and Uruguay,” in Chiyuki Aoi, Cedric de Coning and 
Ramesh Thakur (eds.), Unintended Consequences of Peacekeeping Operations (New York: United Nations 
University Press, 2007), 172. 
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Although this is a relatively a short period, it gives an idea of military leadership, 
peacekeeping participation and the state of CMR at the initial stage. During the 
Panchayat period from 1961 through 1989, Nepal had a stable CMR. However, the 
political system was authoritarian and the king subjugated the military to his own 
political preferences. During the democratic period from 1990 through 2005, the NA 
remained under the dual command of the king and the prime minister, and the king and 
the political parties tried to subjugate the military for their own political ends. Civil-
military relations gradually went from bad to worse when the United Communist Party of 
Nepal (Maoist), hereafter referred to as the Maoists, entered the political mainstream and 
tried to force the military to submit to their own political goals. By the end of the Maoist 
government, CMR had reached its lowest point. 
The thesis then seeks to explain the correlation between civilian interests in 
military matters and CMR using a comparative case study method. It compares and 
contrasts the Nepalese case with Argentina, a case in which peacekeeping participation 
by the Argentinean military greatly improved CMR. Argentina was chosen because there 
are many similarities between Nepal and Argentina, especially in regard to their political 
history and peacekeeping participation. Both countries started taking part in UN 
peacekeeping missions in 1958 and both increased their peacekeeping participation after 
the end of the Cold War. 
This research relies mostly on primary and secondary sources. Primary resources 
include local newspapers, archives, speeches and official documents from the 
government. It also relies on secondary sources, such as books and journals on CMR and 
peacekeeping. Some of the tertiary sources for the research are encyclopedias and related 
web sites. 
The plan of this thesis is as follows. Chapter II gives an account of different 
periods in Nepalese politics from 1950 to 2009, and the situation of CMR. This chapter 
divides Nepalese politics into four major periods based on major political changes and 
the system of governance. Chapter III presents important aspects of Nepalese 
peacekeeping participation from 1958 to 2009. Although the nature of peacekeeping 
participation did not depend much on the political system of governance in Nepal, 
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peacekeeping participation is divided into the four periods used to categorize political 
development for ease of analysis and understanding. Chapter III also includes a brief 
account of the strengths and challenges of Nepalese peacekeeping participation to 
facilitate a detailed understanding of Nepalese peacekeeping efforts. The chapter 
mentions the foreign policy implications of Nepalese peacekeeping participation, which 
is one of the founding objectives of Nepalese peacekeeping. Chapter IV compares the 
case of Nepalese peacekeeping and CMR with the case of Argentina. Despite their 
differences, the political developments and peacekeeping participation is common to both 
countries. However, Argentina is a successful case of improving CMR by peacekeeping 
participation, and Nepal is not a successful case. Chapter IV explains the causes of 
success in Argentina that are lacking in Nepal. Chapter V summarizes the peacekeeping 
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II. POLITICS AND CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN NEPAL 
A. INTRODUCTION 
 Nepal has undergone an enormous political change within a relatively short span 
of time. However, the political problem of governance persists with the same or greater 
intensity, introducing new dimensions and challenges. Lately, the civil-military problem 
relating to the Maoists has surpassed and overshadowed other major issues, creating a 
severe political pathology in the country.  
 The United Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist), the largest political party in 
Nepal, is protesting and rallying every day for what they call the need "to establish 
civilian supremacy in the country."30 The Maoists have been protesting continuously in 
the last few months since their government fell and the relationship between the 
government and the NA turned bad. The present civil-military problem is the most severe 
in the history of Nepal. It has its roots in the decade long Maoist insurgency (1996-2006) 
in which the NA was employed at the most crucial stage.  
  Generally, when there is a civil-military problem, the military institutions are 
considered relatively more responsible for the causes of the crisis than the civilian 
components. In some cases, however, lack of political competency, apathy or antipathies 
are also seen as prime factors in the pathology. Other factors can play a prominent role in 
exacerbating those problems. Therefore, it is imperative to dissect civil-military problems 
in order to understand them in a holistic manner. A correct diagnosis of a problem is 
likely to rationally suggest the correct treatment and prognosis. Thus, the question arises, 
What are the dynamics of the civil-military problem in Nepal? The answer to this 
question is very important to understanding the nature of the problem as well as 
identifying a correct solution. This chapter explains the civil-military problems in Nepal 
from a historical perspective, providing a historical account of Nepal's politics as the 
background conditions of its CMR problem.  
                                                 
30 Mark McDonald, “Protesters Clash With Police in Nepal,” The New York Times, November 12, 
2009. 
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B. HISTORICAL SETTING 
 The concept of the nation-state in Nepal began in 1768–69, after the conquest of 
the Kathmandu valley by Prithivi Narayan Shah, the King of Gorkha.31 It was the final 
conquest that integrated the country after a series of unification battles. Prior to 
unification, Nepal had been divided into many tiny principalities and kingdoms. Even 
prior to unification a stable CMR existed in Nepal.32 During his reign, King Prithivi 
Narayan Shah conquered and extended the kingdom towards the east up to half of the 
size of present day Nepal. Although the military played a crucial role in his most 
ambitious unification process, he always tried to strike a balance between military 
autonomy and control. He even sought consent from the general populace to make 
decisions regarding military matters.33 King Prithivi Narayan Shah's maxims demonstrate 
how cautious he was about civilian military relations at that time. He said, "If the king is 
wise, he will keep the soldiers and the peasants on his side."34 He also emphasized the 
professionalism of the soldiers, and said, "Soldiers should be always honed."35 
 The period after King Prithivi Narayan Shah, between 1774 to 1846, remained an 
era of struggle for political power in Nepal. Many military commanders were actively 
involved in politics. During this period, the state's powers were centralized and the 
military was modernized. The unification campaign was continued by King Prithivi 
Narayan Shah’s successors. His descendants expanded Nepal to twice the size of its 
present-day territory, from the Teesta River in the east, up to the Sutlej River in the west.  
 
 
                                                 
31 Deepak Thapa and Bandita Sijapati, A Kingdom Under Siege: Nepal's Maoist Insurgency, 1996 to 
2003 (Kathmandu: The Printhouse, 2003), 13. 
32 Keshar Bahadur Bhandari, "Civil-Military Relations in Nepal," Paper presented at a seminar 
organized by the Sangam Institute, Kathmandu, Aug 27, 2008.  He writes, "People had a kind of direct 
access to the king (supreme military commander by virtue of his position) and they used to have a say as 
the stakeholder on country affair and military campaign...Even a common people could approach and 
advise the king - the ruler, supreme military commander and final civilian authority on nation's affair." 
33 Bhandari. He mentions, "A kind of practice of conscription existed then which established a belief 
that every soldier is a citizen and every citizen a soldier." 
34 Prithivi Narayan Shah Devko Divya Upadesh, Information and Communication Division, 
Kathmandu, 1953.  
35 Prithivi Narayan Shah Devko Divya Upadesh.  
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At the latter stage of the ongoing campaign, the Nepalese encountered another 
expansionist power, the British East India Company. The two powers clashed, and the 
British declared war against Nepal in 1814. 
 After the war with the British, a series of political crises sprang up in Nepal and 
ultimately empowered Jang Bahadur Rana to usurp absolute power over the country, 
making the king a mere figurehead. From 1846 to 1950 was a period of oligarchy and 
agnate regime in Nepalese history. While ruling the country, the Ranas kept the king as 
the ceremonial head of the state. All the executive, judicial, and legislative powers were 
centralized and exercised exclusively by the Ranas and their family members.36 The 
country ran without a constitution and essential state institutions.  
 Ironically, the process of creating a nation state was not completed even during 
nearly 200 years of transition because of political upheavals and intrigues among the 
various forces. Bhuwan Lal Joshi and Leo E. Rose state, 
After the emergence of Nepal as a nation-state in the last quarter of the 
eighteenth century, the primary goal of the Nepali political system became 
the maintenance of the status quo, which meant the continuation of the 
delicate balance of power among the various elite families composing the 
court. The transfer of the capital from Gorkha to Kathmandu in 1769 gave 
added emphasis to the nationwide scope of the new political system, but 
did not result in any significant changes in the political process itself. 37 
 This political legacy would have important impacts on political development and 
CMR in Nepal. 
                                                 
36 Bhandari maintains, "A culture of family Generals and public soldier; and nepotism, favoritism, and 
Chakari Pratha [An essential concept which means to wait upon, to serve, to appease, and to seek favor 
from politically or administratively well off people] became the norm of those days. CMR in real terms did 
not exist and what existed was in the form of relation between the military master and public in general, 
and it was at its worst.  
37 Bhuwan Lal Joshi and Leo E. Rose, Democratic Innovations in Nepal: A Case Study of Political 
Acculturation (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1966), 485. 
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C. MODERN NEPALESE POLITICAL EVOLUTION AND THE MILITARY   
1. The First Democratic Period (1950–1960) 
Until 1951, Nepal was under the oligarchic Rana rule, and the NA was loyal to 
the Rana rulers. The first tide of democracy ended this oligarchy. The fall of the Rana 
regime created a power vacuum, so the process of establishing a new political order was 
hindered by the critical task of reestablishing central authority in the vacuum created by 
the abolition of the old order. Agreement among four major forces—the monarchy, the 
political parties, the Ranas, and the Indian government in Delhi—created the first post-
Rana government in Nepal. With the shift of the state's power to the king, the army 
ultimately shifted its loyalty to the king.38 The ministries were weak, and rapid 
succession in power by various political forces made the new system further 
dysfunctional. The political parties competed with one another, particularly the Nepali 
Congress and the Gorkha Parishad, and created their own police forces to protect their 
leaders and to manage political rallies.39 In many instances, these private police forces 
were out of the control of their party leaders. Leo E. Rose and John T. Scholz note, "One 
regional party leader's attempted coup in 1952 almost succeeded in overthrowing the first 
Nepali Congress cabinet by using the Congress party's own police force."40 Rose and 
Scholz mention that the country faced numerous security challenges. Political unrest in 
the eastern hills and the Terai, low lands, further worsened the general disorder facing the 
government.41 The Rana-Congress coalition government formed on 18 February 1951 
was not stable enough to exert control over any ministries, including Defense. The 
government fell in nine months.  
                                                 
38 Dhruba Kumar, "Democratic Control of Security Forces," in Rajan Bhattrai and Rose Cave, eds., 
Changing Security Dynamics in Nepal (City: Nepal Institute of Policy Studies and Saferworld, 2008), 140. 
He asserts, "With the transfer of the Bijuli Garad (the elite armed guard), guns and ammunition from 
Singha Darbar (the residence of the Rana prime minister) to Narayanhiti Darbar (the residence of the king), 
the armed forces also shifted their loyalty back to the Supreme-Commander-in-Chief in April 1952." 
39 Leo E. Rose and John T. Scholz, Nepal: Profile of a Himalaya Kingdom (Boulder, Colorado: 
Westview Press, 1980), 42. 
40 Rose and Scholz, Nepal: Profile of a Himalaya Kingdom, 42. 
41 Rose and Scholz, Nepal: Profile of a Himalaya Kingdom, 43. 
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Meanwhile, the king remained influential with the military because of his crucial 
position of power. The king became more powerful when the cabinet's effectiveness 
dwindled as the opposition political parties constantly discredited ministers. The inability 
of the new government to quell the growing security problems brought the king to the 
forefront of the state's power by amending constitutional provisions several times. Rose 
and Scholz point out that the king strengthened the military in order to check political 
disorder and counter the armed threats from private police groups.42 Technical experts 
from India were active in reorganizing the Nepalese administration and the army. Many 
power-sharing governments were formed before an elected government could take office. 
The king played a key role in choosing the members of the cabinet. In the power sharing 
governments, most of the time the prime minister assumed the portfolio of the defense 
ministry, but whenever this portfolio was given to others, the king chose the defense 
minister carefully to retain the loyalty of the military.43 He then made the defense 
ministry less effective by giving it little influence in military matters. 
In 1959, a new constitution was promulgated in which the king was made the 
source of all powers. Its various clauses severely diluted the powers of the Cabinet of 
Ministries, and the country swayed away from the principles of democracy. Following 
the first general election in February 1959, Nepal's first democratically elected 
government took office in May with B. P. Koirala as the prime minister, the leader of the 
Nepali Congress. Advocating democratic socialism, the Nepali Congress advanced free 
education and health care as the government's top agenda. Although the government 
started to achieve a "record of accomplishment unparalleled by that of any previous 
government in Nepal," it failed to provide even essential services on the ground.44 The 
powerful landlords, and personality clashes between King Mahendra and Prime Minister 
Koirala became a major impediment to the working of the government. 
Koirala not only became unable to look after security issues, but also could not 
take political leadership of the NA. There were two major causes for this failure. First 
                                                 
42 Rose and Scholz, Nepal: Profile of a Himalaya Kingdom, 43. 
43 Joshi and Rose, Democratic Innovations in Nepal, 291. 
44 Joshi and Rose, Democratic Innovations in Nepal, 291. 
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was the constitution itself, which created two parallel power centers. Although the 
constitution envisioned two power centers, the king and the prime minister, in reality the 
king remained more powerful and influential than the prime minister. Second, Koirala 
seemed over reliant on India and did not pay much attention to security problems in 
Nepal. He did not succeed in bringing the NA into the democratic fold and taking control 
of it. The Nepali Congress Cabinet had an opportunity to hold the position of the Ministry 
of Defense, but it was unable to pay much attention to defense affairs or to take control of 
the military. This allowed the king to take control of the military even when the Nepali 
Congress was in power. As the Koirala government was trying to establish itself, the king 
removed the Nepali Congress from power after just eighteen months. The king banned all 
political parties and took control of the government. 
King Mahendra's political move would have been very difficult without tangible 
support from the military. Knowing that one of the main reasons for the downfall of the 
Rana regime was the military, King Mahendra quickly took leadership of the military. 
According to Rose and Scholz, the Ranas could not address the problem of the 
overcrowded facilities for the 25,000-man contingent that returned to Nepal after World 
War II.45 It was a clear example of the lack of concern and failing to take leadership of 
the military and it thereby eroding their control. Realizing these weaknesses of the Ranas, 
King Mahendra took a keen interest in the army. He carried out reform in the army by 
broadening the ethnic and social bases of the officer corps in 1952. Prakash Nepali and 
Phanindra Subba maintain, "King Mahendra carefully weeded out overly ambitious 
officers and cultivated loyalty by taking a personal interest in the careers of those in the 
senior ranks."46 Along with the restructuring, he gave the army the right to use the 
"Royal" prefix before its designation in order to show his appreciation and concern for 
the army.47 This is one of the examples of the king taking leadership of the army, 
although the use of the "Royal" prefix may have a different interpretation in the present 
context.  
                                                 
45 Rose and Scholz, Nepal: Profile of a Himalaya Kingdom, 56. 
46 Prakash Nepali and Phanindra Subba, "Civil-Military Relationship and the Maoist Insurgency in 
Nepal," Small Wars and Insurgencies, Vol 16, No. 1 (2005), 85. 
47 Nepali and Subba, Civil-Military Relationship and the Maoist Insurgency in Nepal. 
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The king established the Military Secretariat in the palace to secure total control 
of the military and at the same time to discourage any possible military alliances or 
independent power base. This mechanism also enabled him to cut off the military from 
any political affinity; thus, it focused on professionalism. 
a.  Analysis of the First Democratic Period 
The nature of CMR during the first democratic period can be characterized 
as very unstable. This was the period of political transition and modernization of the NA. 
Since the Ranas were no longer in power, the army was trying to shift its loyalty to 
another political leader, either the king or the democratically elected prime minister. 
During a ten year period, many governments were formed; however, none of them could 
work properly. The political leaders did not pay attention to the military, as they had 
other political priorities. This led to the king, rather than the democratic leaders, 
becoming the political leader of the military.48 After the first democratic election in 1959, 
the Nepali Congress party arose as a dominant political force, but the king's coup 
overthrew the Nepali Congress party from government just in eighteen months.  
In the new political system, the purpose of the military was primarily to 
protect the king's own interest. Political parties viewed the NA as a private army whose 
allegiance had shifted from Rana family to the king's family. This made CMR unstable. 
The political leaders' apathy toward the military, their lack of knowledge about the 
military's functioning, and their perception of the military as a threat were additional 
reasons for the instability of CMR. 
2.  Panchayat Period (1961–1989) 
Nepal remained under absolute monarchy for three decades after the takeover by 
King Mahendra. All political parties were banned in the Panchayat system, which most 
affected the Nepali Congress. Many of its political leaders were incarcerated or went into 
                                                 
48 Radheshyam Adhikari, "People's Army," Himal Khabarpatrika, 30 May - 14 June 2006.  Adhikari 
writes, "When democracy was established in 1951, the military was also reorganized. But the leaders did 
not understand the importance of the security forces and the king was able to convince the Nepali army to 
be loyal to him instead."  
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exile in India. However, some political leaders were able to escape and regrouped in 
India to launch attacks against the king. The Nepali Congress launched rebel attacks with 
the covert support of India, but the attacks were not very successful compared to the pre-
1950 attacks.49  In the meantime, the India-China War broke out in 1962. India stopped 
providing support to the rebels, as it wanted to maintain good relations with Nepal, a 
buffer state between India and China.  
Nearly two years after his takeover, King Mahendra proclaimed a new 
constitution for Nepal, establishing a pseudo-democratic Panchayat system on 16 
December 1962. In this partyless Panchayat system, a so-called guided democracy, the 
ultimate source of power was the king. He wielded all state power, making the separation 
of power among executive, legislative, and judiciary nebulous. Although the new 
constitution tried to address the aspirations of the Nepalese, it was hastily drafted and 
faced problems creating and establishing state institutions.50 The constitution had a 
provision giving the king exclusive power to control the military. He was the supreme 
commander of the military with discretionary power "to raise and maintain armed forces; 
to grant commissions in such forces; to appoint Commanders in Chief and to determine 
their powers, duties and remunerations (Art. 64.1, 64.2)." There was also a constitutional 
provision that clearly spelled out that "no bill or amendment relating to the armed forces 
shall be introduced in either House of Parliament without the recommendations of His 
Majesty (Art. 64.3)."51  
With the support of the military, the king wielded enormous power. This became 
particularly crucial following the royal coup. He could utilize this power to monopolize 
various government affairs, such as appointing favorable persons to administrative 
positions. Although the king monopolized the use of military power to fulfill his political 
ambitions, he always put maximum emphasis on keeping the army out of politics because 
he was aware of the army's past involvement in politics and interference in state affairs. 
                                                 
49 Leo E. Rose and John T. Scholz, Nepal: Profile of a Himalaya Kingdom, (Westview Press, Boulder, 
Colorado, 1980), 50. 
50 Rose and Scholz, Nepal: Profile of a Himalaya Kingdom, 42. 
51 Joshi and Rose, Democratic Innovations in Nepal, 291. 
 23
Bhuwan Lal Joshi and Leo E. Rose write, "Fully cognizant of the role played by the army 
in the mid-nineteenth century developments which deprived the ruling dynasty of all but 
nominal sovereign powers, King Mahendra has taken care to emasculate the military as a 
potent political force and with considerable success."52 While keeping the military out of 
politics and bringing it under his direct command, the king assumed the post of the 
Supreme Commander in Chief. 
After assuming the throne, the king carefully managed the composition of the 
officer corps.  The army's force level was increased and it was given a modest budget, but 
it was barred from other political influence and was made loyal to the king and the 
Panchayat political system. Keeping the military above exogenous political processes 
throughout the Panchayat era made it relatively politically sterile. In many instances, the 
king barred promotions of politically motivated or ambitious officers. Joshi and Rose 
maintain, "Whether intentionally or not, the officer corps has been remarkably apolitical 
since 1956, when the king nipped a potentially dangerous plot in which several lower-
level officers were involved."53 To make sure the subjugation of the military to the king 
was preserved, its members were not allowed to cast votes in elections. The subjugation  
of the military to the king effectively helped to keep the military out of the state's affairs, 
and at the same time gave him a powerful political tool to use in the event of political 
crisis. 
By the end of the second wave of democracy in 1974, many independent third 
world countries experienced military rules or coups. Nepal did not face such problems, 
mainly because the NA was kept under the control of the king and remained politically 
inactive. Other plausible reasons, such as foreign training, exposure to peacekeeping 
missions, and the change in the composition of the officer corps to make it more inclusive 
also helped to avert such possibilities. 54 
                                                 
52 Joshi and Rose, Democratic Innovations in Nepal, 390. 
53 Joshi and Rose, Democratic Innovations in Nepal, 391. 
54 Keshar Bahadur Bhandari, in "Civil-Military Relations in Nepal," asserts, "Army got exposure to 
outside world through foreign training and peacekeeping operation. Composition of the officer corps 
increased from people in general and a group of officers graduated from Military Academy of Nepal." 
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From 1972 to 2001, throughout the reign of King Birendra, there were continuous 
political movements against the Panchayat system. Facing extreme pressure from 
political unrest, King Birendra conducted a plebiscite in 1980 that offered a choice 
between a multiparty democratic system and a "reformed Panchayat system." The result, 
which some political parties believed was rigged, favored the reformed Panchayat 
system. The political parties did not give up their political movements. In 1985, the 
leading political party, the Nepali Congress, launched a political protest, Satyagraha, also 
supported by communist parties. However, it was aborted when the pro-republican leader 
Ramraja Prashad Singh, demanding a republic system in the country, exploded bombs in 
the capital. Ultimately, a mass protest organized by the political parties in 1990 forced the 
king to lift the ban on political parties and establish a multiparty democracy. 
a. Analysis of Panchayat Period 
Although the king's intention was nationalist and broad in external 
approaches; domestically, he was focused on protecting his own regime rather than 
accommodating all the political forces and moving forward. This made civilian control 
relatively parochial and subjective. In addition to the narrow goal of controlling the army, 
the king also transgressed from democratic norms and made the political system 
authoritarian. During this period, the NA was viewed as the king's Praetorian Guard, and 
its high-ranking positions were predominantly occupied by a small number of elite 
groups in the country. For example, members of the Rana, Shah and a few other families 
with close ties to the king occupied the higher military positions.55  
However, the king made every effort to remain in close contact with the 
military and to maintain the military's allegiance to him. He periodically visited the army 
headquarters and various military installations throughout country. He listened to 
problems within the military and provided support, guidance and direction, giving due 
consideration to the logistical, welfare, budgetary and other requirements of the military. 
Rose and Scholz assert, "From the beginning of his reign, Mahendra [the king] took an 
                                                 
55  The Shahs were the ruling family, and the Ranas were the de facto rulers before 1950.  
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active interest in the army."56 Through continuous interaction with the military, the king 
acquired considerable knowledge about the military’s capability, functioning and 
limitations. Realizing that the military can be a formidable political strength, the king 
always relied on the military for reining the country and warding off political 
mobilization against him.  However, he was very careful to prevent the military from  
becoming involved in in politics. Rose and Scholz say that Mahendra "kept active 
military officers strictly out of politics. Thus the army remained an important but isolated 
institution."57 
3. The Second Democratic Period (1990–2005) 
Albeit a little late, the Third Wave of democratization affected Nepal too. This 
global phenomenon swept through various authoritarian regimes and decimated 
dictatorships.58 In Nepal, the popular uprisings commonly known as the People's 
Movements ended in a negotiated settlement with the king establishing a multiparty 
democracy with a constitutional monarchy. This movement did not democratize the 
country by completely overthrowing the authoritarian regime, but rather transplanted 
democracy into the old system.59 The king, because of international pressure and rising 
expectations from the people of Nepal, announced the lifting of the ban on political 
parties in April 1990.  
After the king’s announcement, a constitution writing commission was formed. 
The commission found it difficult to revise the roles and powers of the monarchy in the 
constitution. The king wanted to maintain his sovereignty and was unwilling to give up 
                                                 
56  Rose and Scholz, Nepal: Profile of a Himalaya Kingdom, 56. 
57 Rose and Scholz, Nepal: Profile of a Himalaya Kingdom, 57. 
58 Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (Norman: 
University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), 25. Huntington notes, "By 1990 democratic rumblings were 
occurring in Nepal, Albania, and other countries whose previous experience with democracy had been 
modest or nonexistent."  
59 Huntington, The Third Wave, 151. According to Huntington, in transplacements, democratization is 
produced by the combined actions of government and opposition. Within the government the balance 
between standpatters and reformers is such that the government is willing to negotiate a change of 
regime—unlike the situation of standpatter dominance that leads to replacement—but it is unwilling to 
initiate a change of regime. 
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control of the military. After some negotiation, a compromise was reached in which the 
political parties agreed to give the king the ultimate authority to control the military. 
Thapa and Sijapati write, "The issue of control over the army was resolved by providing 
the king with the authority to mobilize the army, but on the recommendation of a Security 
Council, comprising the prime minister, the defense minister, and the army chief (which, 
theoretically gave the civilian government the upper hand)."60  
Throughout the decade of multiparty democratic practices, the democratic forces, 
and especially the Nepali Congress, did not have a cordial relationship with the army. 
The NA was not a government priority and appeared to remain an institution outside of 
the government system. The neglect was evident from its meager budget allocation and 
disinterest in making the National Security Council functional.61 Since the 
institutionalization of civilian control was ignored, the NA remained apart from the 
democratic process. 
Because of its origin, history, tradition, and role in the creation of the nation, the 
NA sees itself as the ultimate defender of the country. This outlook was not 
commensurate with the major political parties whose approaches were anti-monarchist 
since King Mahendra dismantled the first democratic system in the 1960's. The political 
parties' late arrival on the political scene and antipathy towards the monarchy forced them 
to show a lack of interest in the history of the creation of the country. On the other hand, 
the military was not only forced to remain aloof from political activities and interaction 
with other institutions, it was taught to be loyal to the king and the country rather than to 
the people and the democratic system. At the end of the Panchayat, the gap between the 
political parties and the military was very wide. Yet the ability of the political parties to 
fill the vacuum was not very encouraging. The NA was also very cautious to maintain its 
institutional sanctity and nonpolitical nature. For the most part, civilian political leaders 
                                                 
60 Thapa and Sijapati, A Kingdom Under Siege, 35. 
61  According to Bruneau and Matei , national security council is devised in the constitution to 
promote civilian control and stable CMR. Thomas C. Bruneau, Florina Cristiana Matei and Sak Sakoda, 
“National Security Councils: Their Potential Functions in Democratic Civil-Military Relations,” Defense 
and Security Analysis Vol. 25, No. 3, (September 2009), 255. 
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could not understand the military institution and the concept of national security.  This 
persists even today as an important aspect of civil-military problems in Nepal. 
The new constitution of 1991 provided a democratic system with a constitutional 
monarchy but kept the army under ambiguous control. Although leeway in exercising 
control over the army was given to civilian leaders through the Ministry of Defense and 
the National Security Council, the ultimate authority to mobilize and control the army 
was vested in the king.62 Because of this constitutional provision, the political parties in 
the government sought to control the military through indirect means. For this purpose, 
political leaders tried to minimize the role of the army in the internal security of the 
country. For instance, before 1990, the army was represented in Security Committees at 
the district, zonal and national levels; after 1990, it was kept as only an invitee member in 
these committees. The government tried to reprioritize the roles of the army by 
mobilizing it in national development projects. The army, to protect its institutional 
interests, accepted this role to demonstrate its importance and relevance in the changed 
political context.  
Despite all the changes in policies, the political parties did not succeed in 
influencing the army by manipulating key leadership positions. The resistance from 
within the organization came in order to maintain its nonpolitical nature in the face of a 
highly politicized and dysfunctional police organization. The politicians’ attempt to 
manipulate the army forced it to seek protection from the king, thus maintaining its 
traditional loyalty. This also placed the army in a dichotomous position; in one respect it 
wanted to remain in the democratic fold, in another, it wanted protection from the king. 
At this crucial period, political leaders could not assume the political leadership of the 
national army. Meanwhile, the officer corps raised with the Panchayat era mindset 
became resistant when the vacuum created by the political upheaval was not filled by a 
democratic control mechanism. 
The dual prerogatives inscribed in the constitution did not allow absolute control 
over the army by the politicians or the king. The finance ministry had tightened the 
                                                 
62 Clause 118(2) of Constitution of the Kingdom of Nepal 2047 says, "His Majesty shall mobilize and 
use the Royal Nepalese Army on the recommendation of the National Security Council." 
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defense budget, forcing the army to be compliant with politicians. This was one of the 
mechanisms for the democratic control of the army, but it did not work as it should. The 
frequent changes in the government, rapid formation of unholy alliances, and political 
compromises to grab power made the NA skeptical of loyalty to political leaders. The 
lack of political stability, schism, and extreme individualism in the political culture were 
some of the major factors that ended the institutionalization of civilian control. In such 
political turmoil, national security issues and the army as an institution remained at the 
periphery of the core political problems. The Ministry of Defense had never become a 
ministry of choice for any political party due to its stretched budgets and because the 
king's patronage devised in the constitution left little room for manipulation.63  
Mistrust between the military and political institutions was such that some even 
suspected that the NA and the king did not want to resolve the insurgency problem in 
order to weaken the government.64 When the army submitted a plan to mobilize the 
troops along with development packages with the estimated cost of 6.3 to 6.5 million 
rupees, the government did not approve it. Instead, the government said that the plan was 
too costly and continued seeking police action rather than employing the army. Possible 
reasons for not approving the operational plan were government suspicions about the 
loyalty of the army.65 
Home Minister Govinda Raj Joshi resigned after the Dunai incident of 29 
September 2000, in which he had a strong disagreement with the army for not providing 
support to the police against the Maoists' attack.66 After the Dunai incident, the 
government did not consider the Maoist problem as a law and order problem that could 
be dealt with by a police force. Intending to mobilize the army to counter the Maoist 
attacks, the government tried to secure more control of the army by nominating a 
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64 Nepali and Subba, Civil-Military Relationship and the Maoist Insurgency in Nepal, 92. They write, 
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insurgency, had also been ambivalent about the Maoist threat and saw some benefit in the weakening of the 
civil government and the police force." 
65 Nepali and Subba, Civil-Military Relationship and the Maoist Insurgency in Nepal, 93. 
66 Dunai is a remote area in western Nepal. 
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dedicated defense minister for the first time. Before this, during a whole decade of 
democratic practices, there was no separate defense minister; the prime ministers also 
looked after the Ministry of Defense. Although the government could achieve a majority 
in the three-member National Security Council with the appointment of the new defense 
minister, the plan to mobilize the army could not have materialized without the final 
approval by the king.  
After a decade of complete negation and isolation, when Prime Minister Girija 
Prashad Koirala ordered the NA to mobilize against the Maoists who had besieged a 
group of police personnel in Holeri in July 2001, the army showed reluctance to 
mobilize.67 The army did not show insubordination; however, it set many prerequisites 
for mobilizing the army in counterinsurgency, such as declaration of an emergency, 
consensus from all political parties, and labeling the Maoists as terrorists.68 
Until the Maoists intensified their armed rebellion and the security situation went 
beyond the control of the police force, the government did not feel the necessity of the 
NA. The political leaders had so little interest in or awareness of controlling the army that 
the constitutionally mandated National Security Council did not take shape for a decade. 
This was partly because of the political leadership’s lack of strategic culture and partly 
because of the dual authority specified in the constitution.69 The most important factor 
was the mutual mistrust between the military and the Nepali Congress, which remained in 
government most of the time. This created confusion and difficulties when the 
government needed to mobilize the army. According to Dhruba Kumar:  
The alleged defiance of the Royal Nepal Army to the executive order of 
the prime minister in Dunai (2000) and Holeri (2001) episodes suggests a 
gross misunderstanding persisting between the elected representative 
institutions and the non-elected traditional institutions of the government. 
Although the Article 118 of the 1990 Constitution has asserted the civilian 
supremacy over the armed forces through the organization of a National 
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Defense Council (NDC), the criterion of its smooth functioning was 
blurred as the king was made the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the 
Royal Nepal Army with the final authority to "operate and use" the army 
on the recommendation of the NDC (Article 118(2) and Article 119)70 
The public reverence and allegiance for the monarchy decreased after the 
revolution of 1990, and further dissipated after the palace massacre of King Birendra and 
his family in 2001 that led to various conspiracy theories.71 The king's diminishing 
popularity and patronage also weakened the NA's popular support despite its active 
contribution to the counterinsurgency campaign. 
As mentioned earlier, ever since the establishment of the authoritarian Panchayat 
system, the NA was kept away from societal influences and hence was shielded from 
public criticism. Most of the political parties, media, and academic circles had an attitude 
of indifference about the army before the revolution in 1990, but they started taking an 
interest and commenting on military affairs after that. Many questioned the necessity for 
an army in Nepal, arguing that the country faced no tangible external threats. Some felt 
that it was unwise to keep an unproductive standing army in the face of the two giant 
armies of India and China surrounding its borders. Since its involvement in the 
counterinsurgency campaign, the NA has been under scrutiny from various sectors.   
With the NA having a reserved domain and the political leaders' failure to take an 
interest in military affairs, the army was forced to shield itself from exogenous threats to 
the institution and thereby to function as an autonomous organization. Lacking active 
participation in the new democratic system, the army was still considered the king's 
Praetorian Guard and was criticized by many political parties and others. The political 
parties tried to switch the military’s loyalty from the king to the parties, exerting 
subjective civilian control. The army had fear and mistrust of political parties and the 
new political system, and it was unwilling to give up its prerogatives. The frequent 
changes in government and parochial alliances among the political parties further 
                                                 
70 Dhruba Kumar, Civil-Military Relations in a Democratic Constitution: Legacy and Lessons, Paper 
Prepared for the UNDP National Conference on "Systems of Government" on 18–19 December 2009. 
71 The Nepalese royal massacre occurred in 2001 in the Nepalese royal palace, when the Crown 
Prince, angry over disputes about his marriage, allegedly shot and killed several members of his family. 
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exacerbated the situation. The king's desire to take advantage of the political chaos 
greatly worsened the situation. Ultimately, the situation dragged the military to the 
central stage of politics and compelled it to defend its own interests.72 For instance, at the 
climax of the Maoist armed rebellion, the political parties were so fragmented and 
enervated that it took many months to form a coalition government, and the coalition fell 
apart within a few months. There was chaos and anarchy in the country. Indeed, it was 
not the military but the political situation that forced the military to intervene in politics. 
Huntington states, "The most important causes of military intervention in politics are not 
military but political and reflect not the social and organizational characteristics of the 
military establishment, but political and institutional structure of society."73   
In 2001, the government decided to establish a new security organization, an 
armed police force, to combat the growing Maoist insurgency. Some people believed that 
the new force was raised as a countervailing force to the NA. A small section of the army 
was also suspicious of this development. Subsequently, the relationship between the army 
and the government worsened with the Holeri incident, and as a result, Prime Minister 
Girija Prasad Koirala resigned from the government.  
The mutual mistrust and prejudice between the military and the political 
leadership played a crucial role in the further deterioration of CMR. The army was 
neglected and forced to remain in austerity for ten years, simply because of this mistrust 
and lack of confidence.74 In turn, the army cultivated negative images of the political 
parties due to the aversion towards political parties indoctrinated during the Panchayat 
system and the politician's antipathy and parochial politics. Because of the political 
parties’ uncooperative and antagonistic nature, NA's equidistant posture slowly polarized  
 
                                                 
72 A speech by the army chief gave some clue to the country’s hopeless political situation. In the RNA 
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74 Brigadier General (Ret) Keshar Bahadur Bhandari, "Question of Loyalty and Nepal Army," 
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towards the king, to whom it was loyal for 30 years. Although the marriage of 
convenience between the military and the king seemed beneficial in the short run, 
ultimately it put the military in a dilemma. 
The NA received no political backing, nor did the political leaders think it 
necessary to give any recognition to the sacrifices made by the NA and its members 
during their mobilization in counterinsurgency operations. Ironically, some democratic 
forces rhetorically suggested that the NA and the Maoists renounce the violence and 
come to the negotiation table, presuming that the political parties were the outsiders, 
unaffected by the violence.  
The Maoists declared another ceasefire in January 2003, but the ceasefire broke in 
the latter half of 2003. By the end of the second ceasefire, the Maoists had a strong 
presence in several districts in Western and Eastern Nepal and had extended their 
influence to cities and various urban areas. In February 2005, King Gyanendra took 
power using military and police forces, placing the political parties in the background. In 
September 2005, realizing there was no possibility of military victory, the Maoists 
declared a unilateral ceasefire and concluded a twelve-point agreement with the Seven 
Parties Alliance (SPA) with a view to presenting a common political front against the 
monarchy. In the face of growing pressures and citizen protests in the capital, popularly 
known in Nepal as the "Peoples Movement-II," King Gyanendra gave up power in April 
2006. 
a. Analysis of Second Democratic Period 
Civil-military relations remained somewhat stable during the first decade 
of democratization, but became unstable after that. While the democratic framework 
allowed democratic control of the military by a civilian, the constitutionally structured 
dual authority over the military put the NA in an autonomous position. The democratic 
forces had broad national intentions as opposed to the king's parochial intentions in the 
Panchayat era, but there was skepticism among democratic forces over taking control of 
the military. However, the democratic system did create an environment to manage and 
employ the army in a more democratic manner. It emphasized the inclusion in the officer 
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corps and among the rank and file. In addition to recruiting from a remote area and the 
Terai region, the army also established two ethnically based battalions to make the 
military more national in character. Women were also inducted into the army for the first 
time. People started viewing the NA as a more inclusive national army, although some 
sectors still viewed it as a Praetorian Guard, especially when it aligned with the palace 
after King Gynendra's rule.  
Despite their broad intentions, the democratic leaders’ lack of interest in 
the military and the military's skepticism towards civilian leaders impeded improvements 
in CMR. Although de jure the NA was under democratic control, de facto it operated in a 
vacuum without substantial political control. Political leaders considered the NA as a 
threat to them, rather than their strength. The NA behaved like an autonomous 
organization, keeping itself independent of democratic forces during the initial years of 
democratization. The NA became a more unified institution when it started receiving 
exogenous threats from different directions.75 The political leaders knew very less about 
the military. As the government turned away from the military, exerting stringent 
budgetary control, the NA gradually shifted its loyalty towards the king.  
During the democratic period, 1990–2005, political parties' activities 
contributed to isolating the national army rather than making it a strong and credible 
institution of democracy and national security. However, during this period the NA 
engaged heavily in both national development and international peacekeeping. Although 
peacekeeping was not a new activity, the new orientation and profound involvement gave 
new direction and impetus making it seem like a new role. These new roles helped the 
army remain away from politics and achieve autonomy; thus the NA enjoyed objective 
civilian control during the first decade of the second democratic period. Had the army not 
gotten these new roles, the probability of the army engaging in politics would have been 
high. The army was very hesitant to be involved in internal conflicts from the very 
beginning. Even after its involvement in counterinsurgency operations against the 
Maoists, the army tried to remain out of politics to preserve its control over domains such 
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as officer promotion, appointments and participation in peacekeeping operations. Then 
King Gynendra's political ambitions dragged the army to the center stage of the politics.  
When the Nepali Congress Party was in power, the government tried to 
create a rivalry between the Nepalese Army and other security agencies in order to exert 
control over the army.76 Although rivalry could be one means of civilian control, it did 
not work because the government failed to create a central control mechanism such as 
National Security Council with executive power. Hence, the sole "divide and rule" 
initiative did not work. Intelligence failure and information asymmetry between the 
government and the security agencies, especially the NA, led to unstable CMR and 
weakened the government. The new government did not feel it was necessary to 
restructure the old intelligence system or to establish a new intelligence agency after the 
huge political change. It is vital to realize that knowledge is power without which any 
government is likely to suffer heavily.77 Throughout the democratic period, political 
leaders underestimated the importance of a reliable intelligence system. The security 
agencies, especially the NA, were reluctant to provide their “private” information 
(information known only a particular institution) to civilians. This hindered the civilians’ 
ability to make correct and timely decisions. 
The relationship between the NA and the Nepali Congress Party's 
government became embittered when the government wanted to use the military against 
the Maoist insurgency. Civil-military relations became unstable after the NA was 
involved in counterinsurgency operations. Desch is right in claiming that "a state facing 
low external and high internal threats should experience the weakest civilian control of 
the military. The civilian leadership is less likely to be attentive to national security 
affairs."78 This is because internal threats create complex effects on various groups  
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within a state, and civilian institutions are likely to be weak and deeply divided. In such 
situations, civilian factions try to exert subjective civilian control over the military in 
order to gain military support.  
It is apparent that the NA was swaying away from objective civilian 
control to subjective civilian control around the time when political leaders tried to 
employ the NA against the Maoists in the Dunai incident in September 2000. Until this 
time, the NA seemed to maintain equidistant from the palace and party politics. The royal 
massacre in 2001, the political parties’ attempt to mobilize the army against the Maoists 
in Holeri, and the Maoist attacks on an army barrack in 2001 all clearly brought the 
military under subjective civilian control. The new king Gynendra's political ambitions 
resulted in the subjugation of the military as his tool to control state power by mobilizing 
against other political forces in the country. The democratic political parties were trying 
to control the military to use against the Maoists with an ultra leftist communist ideology 
that aimed to annihilate the democratic forces and to establish a communist regime. In 
their attempt to clear the last hurdle to state power, the military, the Maoists clearly 
provoked and dragged the army into the center of politics. 
4. The Third Democratic Period (2006–2009) 
The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) was signed on 21 November 2006 
between the government of Nepal and the Maoist rebels after months of difficult 
negotiations. Domestic as well as international actors welcomed the CPA. It was 
instrumental in addressing the two key issues, the fate of the constitutional monarchy and 
the end of the Maoists armed struggle. The central elements of the CPA were constituent 
assembly elections, formation of an interim constitution, an interim legislature, an interim 
government, local administration and policing, the monarchy, human rights and 
transitional justice, management of arms and armies, and principles of social and 
economic transformation. The signing of a peace agreement with the Maoists in 
November 2006 paved the way for Maoist participation in the government.  
As a result of the April 2006 movement, the dissolved parliament was reinstated. 
The parliament made a bold proclamation in May that had a watershed effect on 
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reshaping national institutions. For instance, Nepal was declared a secular state. Not only 
did the parliament curtail the king's prerogatives, but also terminated the concept of king-
in-parliament. Parliament hurriedly took decisions for more radical socioeconomic 
changes. Regarding the military, it took far-reaching decisions. The proclamations made 
the following declarations, 
The name "Royal Nepal Army" shall be changed to "Nepalese Army"; The 
Existing provision regarding the National Security Council has been 
repealed. There shall be a National Security Council under the 
chairmanship of the Prime Minister in order to control, use and mobilize 
the Nepalese Army; Chief of the Army Staff of the Nepalese Army shall 
be appointed by the Council of Ministers; The existing arrangement of 
Supreme Commander of the Army has been revoked; The decision of the 
Council of Ministers on mobilizing the Nepalese Army, must be tabled 
and endorsed within 30 days from the special committee assigned by the 
House of Representatives; The formation of the Nepalese Army shall be 
inclusive and national in nature.79 
Amidst political turmoil and mistrust, Prachanda, the supreme commander of the 
Maoists, made his first open appearance in Kathmandu to sign an eight-point agreement 
with the SPA. This agreement was a crucial foundation for subsequent negotiations.80 
Both sides decided to dissolve the parliament and the "people's government" of the 
Maoists, and to form a new interim legislature. In the meantime, Maoist cadres were 
becoming impatient and their threats of an "October Revolution" created widespread fear. 
In addition, an anarchical situation developed, with marginalized and oppressed groups 
demonstrating to demand their rights. The ethnic activists, whose campaigns had 
gathered momentum after the 1990 democratic movement and were put on hold after the 
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Nationalities demanded a secular democratic republic. They also demanded ethnically-
based autonomous regions empowered with legislative, executive and judicial 
authority.81 
In 2008, after successful Constitution Assembly elections, the monarchy was 
officially abolished. No political parties could secure the majority; however, the Maoists 
won enough seats to become the largest political party in Nepal. The former rebel leader 
Pushpa Kamal Dahal, aka Prachanda, was sworn in as the first Prime Minister of the 
Federal Democratic Republic of Nepal. 
The most recent civil-military problem in Nepal developed when the Maoists 
talked openly about launching of an October Revolution, establishing a People's Republic 
in Nepal, and integrating all the Maoist combatants into the NA. Acrimonious relations 
with the Maoists’ government were further embittered when the NA failed to stop its 
recruitment drive despite protests from the Maoist camp, stating that it was too late to 
stop. In the next move, the defense minister Ram Bahadur Thapa, a Maoist leader, 
refused to endorse the routine extension of the tenure of eight Brigadier Generals as 
recommended by the Army Headquarters. Shortly thereafter, the NA's sports team 
walked out of a national sports event protesting the late entry given to the Maoists' 
Peoples Liberation Army. Then, made desperate by their unsuccessful attempts to 
interfere with the army, the Maoists decided to fire the Chief of the Army Staff, General 
Katawal, and sent a letter to him ordering that he explain why he should not be fired for 
insubordination and violation of civilian supremacy. This new row in the ongoing civil-
military tension has polarized political parties. Before the Maoists' decision to fire the 
army chief, most political parties were in favor of asserting more control over the 
military. However, the Maoists' unilateral decision to impose major changes in the army 
to serve their party's vested interest worried the rest of the political parties. This situation 
left the Maoists alone, without the support of any other political parties. The moment the 
Maoists unilaterally fired the army chief, the rest of the political parties requested that the 
President take a stand against the Maoists' move. The President, who cautioned the 
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Maoists not to make such a sensitive decision without political consensus, finally sent a 
letter telling the army chief to stay in his position until further notice. The Maoist-led 
government finally fell when their position became untenable due to national and 
international pressure. 
Despite the latest civil-military problem, some firmly believe that the NA has 
displayed a great deal of loyalty to the rulers of the day when they established themselves 
as legitimate rulers and underwent a successful transition.82 In its long history, the 
Nepalese Army has served political leaders in many forms, including absolute monarch, 
regent, oligarch, democratic ruler, and authoritarian ruler. Finally, after the abolition of 
the monarchy and establishment of a republic system, the army is functioning under the 
new government and the president as per the constitutional arrangements. Huntington 
asserts, "The shift from a traditional ruling monarchy to middle-class praetorian is also 
mediated by the military. The military is typically the most modern and cohesive force in 
the bureaucracy of a centralized monarchy, and the monarchy typically falls victim to 
those it has strengthened to serve its ends."83 In fact, despite many "palace revolutions" 
and "royal coups," there was not an attempt at a military coup.84 The quintessential 
example of the loyalty to the ruler is that the military readily submitted to the Maoist 
government against whom it fought a bloody battle that had caused a large number of 
deaths in its organization. Also, the NA protected the same Maoist leaders whom it had 
sought to kill during the armed rebellion once they held different governmental positions.  
Nevertheless, the latest situation clearly shows that there was a dire civil-military 
problem despite the army’s subservience to the legitimate ruler. The situation also 
confirms Huntington's claim that even without a coup, CMR can still be unstable. 
However, refuting the claim that by shirking its duties, the NA did not respect civilian 
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supremacy, Brigadier General (Ret) Keshar Bahadur Bhandari asserts, "The army did try 
to be loyal to the constitutionally elected government and at the same time preserving its 
patronage towards the king."85 This dilemma of dual loyalty seems esoteric. However, 
scrutiny reveals two main reasons behind it. First, the power sharing provision in the 
constitution specified dual authority over the military. Second, the loyalty towards the 
king was more path-dependent than politically motivated. The path dependency resulted 
not only because the democratic government did not try very hard to consolidate and win 
the confidence and loyalty of the army, but also because of the historical legacy of 
allegiance to the king. Although the NA did not embrace any specific political ideology 
and had served the democratic and communist governments during second democratic 
period, the army was reluctant to trust politicians because of its thirty years of 
subjugation under the king and the Panchayat system.  
The Nepalese case clearly shows that CMR is dynamic, with changes that depend 
upon the balance of power among various political forces. In Nepal, the dynamics of 
CMR changed, tipping the balance, when the Maoists unilaterally decided to impose their 
will upon the military, ignoring the roles of other political forces in the political equation. 
The Maoists' action resulted in a new polarization of political forces and destabilized the 
balance of power between the cabinet and the President enshrined in the constitution. The 
Maoists' rhetoric of "civilian supremacy" remained contradictory since they themselves 
tried to undermine the constitutional role of the president, who is not only the supreme 
commander of the NA, but also the civilian head of state. Here, it is worth noting that the 
slogan of civilian control was chanted not only in Nepal, but also in the English 
Parliament in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries in an attempt to reduce the 
authority of the crown over the military and to maximize parliamentary control of the 
armed forces.86   
According to the present interim constitution of Nepal, the President is the 
supreme commander of the army who must provide overall guidance and iconic 
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leadership, but the executive must take actual political leadership of the army.87 The 
prime minister, as head of the executive, and the defense minister, as head of the 
department, should assume leadership of the military. Other stakeholders, especially the 
legislature, must also show their interest in the military establishment by providing 
constant guidance, monitoring and supervision. The military, as the only institution with 
authority to hold a monopoly on violence, must be controlled with checks and balances; 
this is even more important during a transitional period. If any one of the branches is 
given exclusive authority to exercise control over the military, without checks and 
balances, that branch will affect an imbalance of power with other branches, 
monopolizing the coercive power of the military.  
a. Analysis of the Third Democratic Period 
Civil-military relations during the third democratic period were very 
unstable. The NA did not enjoy intimate relations with either the interim government or 
the Maoist-led government. The NA's relations with the interim government were 
uncomfortable. This was obvious because of the collaboration between the democratic 
forces and the Maoists. The relationship became even worst when the Maoists led the 
government. Since the NA had launched a counterinsurgency operation against the 
Maoists, the Maoist-led government remained antagonistic to the NA.  
This period is characterized by struggle between subjective and objective 
civilian control. The NA wanted to maintain professionalism, autonomy and its 
nonpolitical nature by advocating objective civilian control, whereas the political parties, 
and especially the Maoists, want to bring the NA under subjective civilian control. The 
two major democratic parties, the Nepali Congress Party and the CPN (UML), seemed 
comfortable with objective civilian control as long as no political forces tried to use the 
military for their vested interests. However, these two parties also tended to exert 
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subjective civilian control by intervening politically when other political forces try to 
manipulate the military. This was evident during King Gynendra's reign in which the 
Nepali Congress Party tried to exert subjective civilian control when the king apparently 
subjugated the military in order to fulfill his interests. The Nepali Congress Party again 
advocated subjective control over the military when the Maoists were trying to form a 
government for the first time after the Constitution Assembly election. The Nepali 
Congress Party openly demanded control of the Ministry of Defense as a precondition to 
participating in the Maoist-led coalition government. The NA was also in a dilemma, 
despite its desire to maintain autonomy and objective civilian control. When the Maoists 
threatened the army’s autonomy and objective civilian control, the NA tacitly sought 
protection from non-Maoist forces, thus, digressing away from objective civilian control.   
D. NEPALESE CMR THROUGH THEORETICAL LENSES  
Civil-military relations are complex, and CMR is a fairly nebulous topic in the 
Nepalese case. Many theories exist to explain CMR in different political settings and 
military institutions; it can be interpreted through different theoretical lenses. Therefore, 
determining what is good and bad in terms of CMR is often difficult since it depends on 
the context.   
Many evaluate CMR in terms of coup d'état, but this is not the only form of 
measurement. Huntington points out that "a nation can have poor CMR without the threat 
of a coup."88 For instance, although not a military coup per se, Nepal has experienced 
civil-military problems of different intensities and in different periods. During the rift 
between the Nepalese Army and the Maoist-led government, the army did not orchestrate 
a coup although CMR were still unstable. This episode of civil-military problems is 
considered the most severe in the history of democratic Nepal.  
Janowitz suggests that good or bad CMR can be assessed by the extent to which 
the military interferes outside of military matters. He believes that if the military confines 
itself to the military sphere and does not transgress beyond it; the situation can be 
                                                 
88 Huntington, The Soldier and State. 
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characterized as good CMR.89 However, the dynamic nature of military roles blurs the 
distinction between civil and military roles. The limit of the military sphere depends upon 
the types of roles performed by the military; if a military is engaged in civilian types of 
roles, military and non-military matters are likely to be less distinctive. For instance, the 
Nepalese Army's primary roles were to defend the country from external and internal 
threats; however, for more than fifty years it has been involved mainly in peacekeeping 
missions, national development programs, and aid to civil authorities. Even after the 
establishment of the new political system, the roles of NA have not changed. It may be 
difficult to distinguish between military matters and non-military matters when carrying 
out non-military functions such as national development programs to construct road 
networks. 
In explaining Nepal's CMR through the lens of Huntington's theory of civilian 
control, some scholars have characterized it as objective civilian control.90 The autonomy 
enjoyed by the Nepalese Army, its participation in peacekeeping missions and the level 
of professionalism displayed in its functioning might have lead to this conclusion. On the 
other hand, the king subjugated the military to his own will, not that of the state. The 
military was treated as his private servant, making it subservient to his personal will and 
the Panchayat. This installed a form of subjective civilian control, subject to the will of 
the king.  
Huntington's theoretical basis for objective civilian control is that a professional 
military readily submits to politicians; it obeys the civilian order in any circumstance.91 
This hypothesis may hold true in advanced democracies such as the U.S., but may not be 
the case in new democracies. It generally depends upon the socio-cultural, political and 
economic aspects of the society.  
                                                 
89 Janowitz, The Professional Soldier, 13. 
90 Saubhagya Shah, “Democratization of Nepal Army: Establishing Civilian Supremacy,” Conference 
Paper presented at the Nepal Army Command and Staff College, Shivapuri, Kathmandu (22-23 September 
2009). He claims, "The Nepal Army, on the other hand, has historically evolved along the objective control 
tradition." 
91 Huntington, The Soldier and State. 
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It is true that the NA has developed its nonpolitical nature for almost half a 
century, following its massive restructuring. However, since the establishment of multi-
party democracy and the decade-long Maoist insurgency, the whole gamut of political 
and social dynamics have changed. Although the NA tried to remain nonpolitical because 
of its Panchayat era legacy, it always remained in the center of politics because of its 
pivotal role in the political order in a changing society, and its interests, preferences, and 
disagreements. Currently, the peace process is stalled and the Maoists are demanding 
integration of their combatants into the NA. Similarly, the constitution and military acts 
have required the NA to be more inclusive, incorporating specified percentages of 
women and Madheshi, Dalit, Janjati and other ethnic groups.92 The Maoists, who 
exercised subjective civilian control over their Peoples Liberation Army by following the 
Chinese and Russian model and provisioning a political commissar in the military 
organization, expect to see a similar kind of control in the national army.  
Unlike Huntington's institutional approach that suggests "militarizing the 
military;" Janowitz's sociological approach advocates reflecting contemporary society in 
the military institution by "civilianizing the military." The institutional approach focuses 
on the relationship between the military and the civilian leadership, whereas the 
sociological approach emphasizes the relationship between the military and the larger 
civil society. When the Nepalese constitutional mandate demands "Making the national 
army national in character," what types of civilian control will become the function of 
CMR is a pertinent question.93 
Under authoritarian rule, a single political party, which is likely to hold power for 
several years, can have a monopoly over the use of the military. Hence, it is likely to 
exert subjective control effectively. Even in a well-established democratic system where 
the political situation is stable, subjective civilian control is likely to work well. However, 
subjective civilian control becomes more complicated in a new democracy full of 
                                                 
92 Article 144 (4A) of the Interim Constitution of Nepal 2007 states, “In order to make the Nepal 
Army national in character, the entry of citizens, including Madhesis, indigenous nationalities, Dalits, 
women and those from marginalized areas, shall be ensured through legal provisions on the principles of 
equality and inclusiveness.” 
93 Article 144 (4A) of the Interim Constitution of Nepal - 2007. 
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uncertainties, fragmented political constituencies, mistrust among the political forces, and 
a history of frequently making and breaking political alliances with individual and group 
interests.   
Civil-military relations often consist of determining who prevails when the 
civilian and the military preferences diverge.94 If civilians prevail over the military most 
of the time, then CMR is considered stable; otherwise not. In the latest Nepalese scenario, 
there were many instances where the civilians did not prevail. When the Maoist-led 
government tried to fire the Chief of the Army Staff of the NA, the president did not 
approve the move because almost all the political parties urged him not to approve. This 
example shows a clear rift between the civilians and the military.95 The nature of CMR 
was paradoxical in this particular case.  
Michael Desch asserts that civilian control over the military is likely to be most 
effective when the military engages in external missions. On the other hand, CMR is 
likely to be most worrisome when the military engages in internal roles. When the 
country faces an external threat, the military and civilians tend to converge and their 
differences diminish. During internal crises, the military and civilians, as part of the same 
society, are likely to have differences. For fifty years, NA has focused on external 
missions by participating in peacekeeping operations; however, it did not enjoy stable 
CMR as the theory suggests. Nepal did experience unstable CMR once it mobilized the 
military for internal roles, as described by Moskos. 
Nonetheless, one of the important frameworks for stable civilian control of the 
military is the constitutional provision. If a constitution does not allow a single branch of 
a state to monopolize the control of the armed forces, then civilian control and CMR are 
likely to be good. In the U.S., the President is designated as Commander in Chief of all 
armed forces by the Constitution, but the Constitution also empowers the Congress to 
create, regulate and maintain a military, determine its size and levy taxes to pay for it. 
Even though the executive branch through the Department of Defense proposes the 
                                                 
94 Janowitz, The Professional Soldiers. 
95 Twenty-three of 25 political parties were in favor of the Nepalese Army's position.  
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defense budget, the legislative branch, the Congress, has the ultimate right to increase, 
decrease, or approve the budget. The Congress has an absolute right to scrutinize and 
check the validity of any military expenditure.96  
According to Peter D. Feaver, military agents work when they are monitored and 
shirk when they are not. Therefore, civilian principals must devise optimal monitoring 
mechanisms in order to avoid shirking. Feaver says, "At the extreme end of shirking is 
the traditional civil-military concern of coup. At the extreme end of working is some 
ideal-type military that does everything the civilian has contracted with it to do, 
vigorously and without subversion."97 Information asymmetry also plays an important 
role in the outcome of CMR. If the military agent holds private information that the 
civilian principal does not know, then chances of the agent's shirking is very high. The 
NA did not shirk under the Panchayat system because of a strong monitoring mechanism 
and absence of information asymmetry between the king and the military. 
The conception that stable CMR prevail only in democracies may not be true. 
Certainly, democratic control of the armed forces is one model of civilian control that 
may be suitable for new and old democracies, but it is neither an ideal type nor it is a 
panacea for all civil-military pathologies. However, democratic control is preferable 
because of its widely acceptable attributes and relations with other institution of the state. 
Nepal has facades of democratic institutions and control mechanisms enshrined in the 
constitution; however, these are either ineffective or nonfunctional. This shows that 
merely having constitutional provisions does not ensure good CMR and civilian control. 
Constitutional provisions should be reinforced by enabling and empowering the 
institutions necessary for civilian control. Some scholars emphasize that along with 
control, effectiveness and efficiency are equally important. Bruneau maintains, "The 
three fundamental issues of CMR are: (1) democratic civilian control; (2) effectiveness in 
                                                 
96 Richard H. Kohn, "The Constitution and National Security: The Intent of the Framers," in Richard 
H. Kohn, ed., The United States Military under the Constitution of the United States, 1789–1989 (City: 
New York University Press, 1991). 
97 Peter D. Feaver, Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight, and Civil-Military Relations, (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 2003), 62. 
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achieving roles and missions; and (3) efficiency."98 This neo-institutional framework 
advocates that the essence of CMR is not just the "civilian control of the military," but 
rather the effective use of the military as an instrument of national power by civilians to 
realize national interest. Without effectiveness, mere democratic control may not serve 
the purpose of stable CMR and national interests. Yet, civilian control is the primary 
requirement for stable CMR.  
In democracy, the civilian control is exercised by democratic methods. The focus 
of democratic control is installing accountability by the strengthening the ministry of 
defense and making it effective with civilian leadership. Bruneau and Goetze say, "The 
four key competencies a MOD must master are in the areas of budgets, personnel, 
acquisitions, and definition of roles and missions."99 While this framework is suitable for 
mature democracies, it is not easy to install these competencies in new democracies and 
in countries with serious political problems. Kumar maintains: 
Without the rule of law, a democratic constitution, a system of checks and 
balances and viable, functioning institutions, it would be difficult to 
conceive of democratic control of security sector. Furthermore, it would 
be hard to maintain civilian control over security forces in a country with a 
weak, risk-averse, infirm and intemperate leadership that desists from 
taking any initiative to adopt legislations and policies and refuses to 
implement laws that are relevant to the security sector.100 
Various dynamics come into play for the outcomes of particular civil-military 
relations. To achieve stable CMR and effective civilian control, various combinations of 
civilian and military equilibrium can be applied depending upon the power-sharing 
agreement and other factors. Bruneau writes, "Although the 'proper' balance between 
democratic civilian leadership and military effectiveness in achieving roles and missions 
                                                 
98 Thomas C. Bruneau, "Democracy and Effectiveness: Adopting Intelligence for the Fight Against 
Terrorism,” International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence Vol. 21 (2008), 450. 
99 Bruneau and Goetze, "Ministers of Defense and Democratic Control," in Who Guards the Guardians 
and How, 83.  
100 Kumar, "Democratic Control of Security Forces," 136. 
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will clearly vary from country to country and era to era...equilibrium is fundamental to 
the success of authentic democratic governance."101 
The national and international environments are important factors shaping CMR. 
The nation’s culture, history and traditions are crucial to CMR as well. The NA Chief of 
the Army Staff, Gen. Chhatra Man Singh Gurung, says, "A country's national security 
system must strike a balance between the mechanisms adopted to retain civilian control 
over the military and the scope of professional autonomy rendered to the military."102  
Civil-military relations involve different things for different people in different 
systems of governance. A successful model in a certain type of system may not be 
applicable to others. One size does not fit all. Culture, tradition, and perceptions matter, 
too. Kumar emphasizes a pragmatic approach to CMR in contrast to Feaver's assertion 
that "civilians have rights to be wrong."103  Kumar says, "Maintaining civilian supremacy 
and stable civil-military relations does not mean that the armed forces should obey 
civilian orders imprudently."104    
E. CONCLUSION 
There have been ebbs and flows in CMR in Nepalese history. The tide of the 
civil-military problem reached the high water mark under the Maoist-led government. 
The swift evolution in Nepalese politics after the end of the Maoist insurgency highlights 
the dynamic nature of CMR. The successful alliance between the seven political parties 
and the Maoists ensured the downfall of the old regime. Political upheaval and the 
removal of the monarch from the helm of Nepalese politics brought the alliance to the 
center of state power, where it sought to exert subjective civilian control over the military 
as it had been under the king. But, after the Constitutional Assembly election, when the 
                                                 
101 Bruneau, "Introduction," Who Guards the Guardians and How, 1.  
102 Gen. Chhatra Man Singh Gurung, the Chief of the Army Staff of the Nepalese Army, seminar on 
"Developing Civil-Military Relations in the Federal Democratic Republic of Nepal" (Nepalese Army 
Command and Staff College, Kathmandu, September 22, 2009).  
103 Feaver, Armed Servants. 
104 Dhruba Kumar and Mohiuddin Ahmed, Nepali State, Society and Human Security: An Infinite 
Discourse (Dhaka: The University Press Ltd., 2009). 
 48
political equation changed and the efficacy of the alliance dissipated, the dynamics of 
CMR also changed. When the government tried to subjugate the military to serve the 
interests of political parties rather than the interests of the government or the state, the 
country faced a political disaster.  
Examination of the civil-military situation in Nepal in post-Rana rule reveals 
different trajectories of CMR. These trajectories do not necessarily follow the political 
system or ideological pattern. Analysis of the political developments in Nepal suggests 
that rather than political system itself, other political attributes have dictated Nepalese 
CMR, such as political culture, weak political institutions, the personalities of political 
leaders, and the interests of political elites. 
The first democratic period was a state of political turmoil marked by 
transformation and the NA’s transition of loyalty. This was the period when political 
institutions were first introduced in Nepal, including the constitution, and CMR was 
unstable during this period. After the establishment of Panchayat system, political 
institutions started taking shape and CMR seemed to be stable. The three decades of 
Panchayat rule might have made the NA non-political at the institutional level, but CMR 
remained under subjective civilian control as the NA became subjected to the king's 
interests.  
After the establishment of constitutional monarchy and multiparty democracy, 
CMR gradually became unstable because of the dual control of the NA. The nebulous 
constitutional provision for control of the military and political chaos led to military 
autonomy. During this period, the NA's professionalism also increased remarkably. Thus, 
the second democratic period showed many attributes of objective civilian control.  In the 
third democratic period, with the end of the Maoist insurgency and the Maoist rise in 
power in a marriage of convenience with democratic political parties, CMR have been 
very unstable and completely polarized. Apart from the high level of political influence, 
the military's reserve domain and prerogatives have created tension in CMR and the 
nature of civilian control has oscillated between objective and subjective civilian control.  
 It is obvious that there are many CMR problems in Nepal. Some dimensions are 
normative, while others are inherently structural. The lack of a strategic culture among 
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the political leadership, ignorance about security, political instability, parochialism and 
individualism, mistrust, and a lack of common objectives and national interests are 
prominent factors contributing to Nepal’s civil-military pathology. The Ministry of 
Defense’s rudimentary functioning and the monarch’s direct control of the army for 
several years are other important factors. The military's resistance to complying with 
civilian interests, unwillingness to give up its prerogatives, and control over its reserve 
domain are other impediments to stable CMR. Unnecessary interference from 
neighboring countries in Nepalese internal affairs is a main component of Nepalese 
political turmoil and has a direct link to CMR. These indicate that civilian control of the 
military and CMR are both dynamic and country specific phenomena shaped by several 
elements. Indeed, while CMR simply cannot be explained or summarized by a single 
variable, the most important variable behind the civil-military pathology in Nepalese 













THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 51
III. NEPAL'S PARTICIPATION IN UN PEACEKEEPING 
OPERATIONS 
A. INTRODUCTION  
Nepal has been taking part in UN peacekeeping missions since three years after it 
became a member of the UN, and has contributed numerous peacekeepers in multiple 
missions.105 Nepal commemorated 50 years of participation in UN peace support 
operations in 2008.106 Currently, Nepal is the fifth largest troop contributor to UN 
peacekeeping missions.107 Nepal considers its contribution to UN peacekeeping 
operations as a tool for implementing Nepalese foreign policy, which is guided by the 
principles of UN Charter.108 
Whenever Nepal has to claim its space in international forums, it refers to the 
Nepal's contributions to international peace and security through peacekeeping 
participation. This shows the importance of peacekeeping in Nepal’s foreign policy.109 Its  
 
                                                 
105 The Nepalese Army in UNPKO, http://www.nepalarmy.mil.np/na_un.php (accessed Dec 19, 
2009), and information received from Birendra Peace Operation Training Center, Panchkhal, Nepal. 
106 Nepalese Army, The Nepalese Army in Peace Support Operations, (Kathmandu:  NADPKO, 
2008), DVD ROM.  
107 UN, "The Ranking of Military and Police Contributors to UN Operations," 31 October 2009, 
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/contributors/2009/oct09_2.pdf. (accessed 29 November 2009). 
108 Foreign Policy of Nepal, Government of Nepal, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
http://www.mofa.gov.np/nepalun/statement6.php (accessed December 19, 2009). 
109 Prime Minister Puspa Kamal Dahal, a former rebel leader, said in the United Nations, "Over the 
years, peacekeeping has evolved as the soul of UN. With this in mind, Nepal has been regularly sending its 
peacekeepers at the call of UN since 1958. We are celebrating the 50th anniversary of Nepal's continuous 
participation in the UN peacekeeping operations.  I take this opportunity to reiterate Nepal's commitment 
that we will continue to provide our troops for the cause of peace worldwide. We are glad that they have 
earned accolades for their professional competence and performance both at home and abroad. We consider 
this as our modest contribution to international peace and security." Similarly, Prime Minister of Nepal, 
Madhav Kumar Nepal, in his address to the 64th session of UN General Assembly says, "We are proud of 
our men and women who have served as blue helmets and contributed to the maintenance of international 
peace and security with professionalism, honesty, impartiality and dedication." Delivering a speech at a 
program organized by the Nepal Council of World Affairs in Kathmandu, March 5, 2008, Sahana Pradhan, 
Foreign Minister of Nepal, asserts, "This year [2008] marks the 50th year of Nepal's participation in the UN 
peacekeeping operations. Our long and continued service to the cause of global peace under the aegis of 
UN has been well appreciated by the international community. And we remain fully committed to continue 
with this global responsibility at the call of UN." 
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peacekeeping contributions allowed Nepal to become an organizational committee 
member of the UN Peace Building Commission for 2008/2009 in the category of troop-
contributing countries.110 
B. BACKGROUND 
After becoming a member of the UN in 1955, Nepal participated in the 1958 
peacekeeping mission in Lebanon, UNOGIL. Nepal has since contributed to UN missions 
in the Middle East, Africa, Europe and the Caribbean.111 As of November 2009, Nepal 
has contributed 74,000 troops in 34 missions around the globe, and at present, the NA has 
deployed more than 3,000 peacekeepers in 13 different missions (Table 1) in the capacity 
of military observers, military liaison officers, staff officers in mission headquarters, and 
as contingent members.112 The government of Nepal has signed to make 5,000 troops 
available, as and when requested, to the UN Standby Arrangement System (UNSAS).113   
The increasing demand for peacekeepers is becoming a management challenge. 
To manage Nepalese peacekeeping missions, the NA established a dedicated 
peacekeeping directorate in army headquarters. The Directorate of Peacekeeping is 
responsible for the management of the entire army's peacekeeping system. The main 
function of the directorate is to make the army ready to succeed in the complex 
operational environment of modern peacekeeping.  
 
                                                 
110 United Nations Peace Building Commission, website: http://www.un.org/peace/peacebuilding/ 
mem-orgcomembers.shtml (accessed on 19 December 2009), and information from BPOTC. 
111 UN Secretary General Ban Ki Moon says, "Bravery of one Nepali soldier is very fresh in my mind. 
In June 2005, Maj Kabindra Jung Thapa was helping to escort a Human Rights team to a dangerous part of 
the Democratic Republic of Congo. They were investigating that night, one of the worst atrocities of war 
there. When he was leaving, hundreds of armed militia surrounded helicopter and started fire. Maj Thapa 
made sure that every person got inside on the helicopter; he was the last to board. Just when he got inside 
the helicopter, he was shot and killed. Maj Thapa died protecting his comrades, he died protecting the cause 
of peace, and Human Rights—he died protecting UN." The Nepalese Army, The Nepalese Army in Peace 
Support Operations (Kathmandu:  NADPKO, 2008), DVD ROM. 
112 According to the Birendra Peace Operation Training Center (BPOTC), as of November 2009. 
113 Birendra Peace Operation Training Center (BPOTC), and Himalaya Thapa, United Nations 
Peacekeeping Operations and Nepal's Participation (1958-2008): An Evaluation, Master's thesis, University 
of Westminster, Regent Campus, Diplomatic Academy of London, 6 August 2008. 
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Mission Contingent Observers Staff officers Total 
MINUSTAH (Haiti) 718 - 10 728 
MINUSTAH (Haiti) 350 - - 350 
MONUC (Congo) 850 22 7 879 
MONUC (Congo) 175 - - 175 
UNAMIL (Liberia) 15 2 3 20 
UNIFIL (Lebanon) 850 - 19 869 
UNTSO (Israel) - 3 - 3 
UNMIS (Sudan) - 9 9 18 
UNAMID (Darfur) - 10 23 33 
UNMIT (Timor) - - 1 1 
MINURCAT (Chad) - - 18 18 
UNAMI (Iraq) - - 2 2 
UNOCI (Ivory Coast) - 3 1 4 
Total    3100 
Table 1.   NA's current deployment in UN peacekeeping missions  
(as of November 2009) 
Most NA members have participated in a UN peacekeeping mission at least once 
in their military career. After serving for a few years in the army, almost all NA officers 
participate in UN peacekeeping missions more than once. Participating in UN 
peacekeeping is an opportunity for professional enhancement for many Nepalese soldiers. 
Apart from gaining experience, Nepalese Army personnel also receive monetary benefits 
that help raise their living standards and keep them motivated during peacekeeping 
activities and in their own country.114 The UN allowance is four to ten times higher than 
a standard salary in Nepal. At the institutional level, economic benefits from 
peacekeeping have become an important source for the welfare fund. This shows that 
peacekeeping missions have become the NA's one of the major roles.115 
                                                 
114 The ICG report states, "UN missions not only serve an internal patronage system (allowing the top 
brass to reward or punish officers by granting or denying postings) but are a major source of income and 
prestige for the army as a whole, and senior officers in particular." International Crisis Group, "Nepal: 
Peace and Justice," ICG Asia Report No. 184, January 14, 2010, 13. 
115 The recommendation of ICG Report No. 184 is to "apply pressure to the NA where it hurts most," 
referring to putting pressure on the Nepalese Army's participation in peacekeeping missions—a center of 
gravity? 
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C. NEPALESE PARTICIPATION IN UN PEACEKEEPING MISSIONS 
1. The First Democratic Period (1950–1960) 
The first democratic period from 1950 through 1960 was a time of political 
upheaval and transformation in Nepal. This is also the period of establishing national 
identity and preserving national integrity and sovereignty. The king and the political 
parties considered the UN to be the protector and the guarantor of national identity, 
integrity, independence and sovereignty.116 Thus, the decision to participate in UN 
peacekeeping missions in 1958 was a crucial one, a watershed moment in Nepalese 
foreign policy.  
 
Nepalese Army in Peace Support Operations 
Mission Year 
UNOGIL, Lebanon (Military Observers)  1958 
Table 2.   NA's UN peacekeeping participation during first democratic period  
(1950–1960) 
When Nepal sought UN membership in 1949, the Soviet Union raised the 
question of Nepalese sovereignty. Nonetheless, Nepal became a UN member in 1955. 
The following year saw 
the 1956 vote in the UN General Assembly on the Hungarian questions, in 
which Nepal voted with the West against the Soviet block... [and not] with 
India, thus establishing Nepal's credentials as a sovereign and independent 
state in the international forum.117 
                                                 
116 Nepalese Prime Minister B.P. Koirala laid "the strongest emphasis on Nepal's historical 
independence and its full faith in UN as the custodian of its integrity and sovereignty." The prime minister 
also "pleaded strongly for an acceptance by the major powers of a plan for graduated disarmament 
concurrent with the establishment of a peace force under the auspices of UN. He strongly endorsed the 
Secretary General's constructive role in the Congo and rejected the 'troika' plan suggested by the Soviet 
Union for manning UN Secretariat." See Bhuwan Lal Joshi and Leo E. Rose, Democratic Innovations in 
Nepal: A Case Study of Political Acculturation (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1966), 372. 
117 Leo E. Rose, Nepal's Strategy for Survival, (University of California Press, 1971), 214. 
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The fluid domestic, regional and international political situation made Nepal's 
survival as a nation state of primary importance during 1950s and 1960s. In an address to 
the 15th Session of the UN General Assembly, Prime Minister Bisheswar Prasad Koirala 
said: 
The foreign policy of Nepal is wholly inspired by the purposes and 
principles of UN. We regard UN not only as a bulwark of our 
independence and security, but also as the protector of our rights and 
freedom…We believe in the independent exercise of our judgment in 
considering international issues…While we welcome and are grateful for 
the help that is being given to us by friendly governments—those  of 
India, the United States, China, the USSR, the United Kingdom and 
others—as well as by UN, we do not want any country to tell us how we 
should think, or how we should conduct our internal affairs.118 
After the Rana rule and until 1960, the various governments in Nepal had 
different foreign policy preferences.119 But the king wanted to have a balanced 
relationship between the two giant neighbors and to maintain the sovereignty of Nepal. 
While the king was searching for opportunities, he found that participating in 
international peacekeeping missions under the aegis of the UN was the best way to retain 
sovereignty and national independence. Invasion or any form of aggression against Nepal 
by its neighbors would instantly draw the attention of the UN, not only because Nepal 
was a member state but also because it was an important contributor to the cause of 
international peace.  
Despite the NA's participation in UN peacekeeping missions, civilians could not 
be effectively involved in peacekeeping activities. The government was weak most of the 
time, and the king tried to control the Ministry of Defense by influencing the selection of 
the defense minister. The politicians were more interested in other ministries with larger 
budgets than the Ministry of Defense. Therefore, the Ministry of Defense could not play 
an active role in Nepal's internationalist approach. In a later stage, the powers of the 
                                                 
118 Bisheswar Prasad Koirala, Prime Minister of Nepal, Address to the 15th Session of the General 
Assembly of the UN, New York, September 29, 1960. 
119 Rose, 214. For instance, Tanka Prasad Acharya's government was suspicious of Indian intentions 
and wanted to give a novel dimension to its diversification policy by establishing a closer tie with China; 
M. P. Koirala and Dr. K. I. Singh were pro-Indian. 
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defense ministry were centralized at the king's palace under the powerful Principal 
Military Secretariat, which played a pivotal role in military matters thereafter.   
2. The Panchayat Period (1961–1989) 
The first Nepalese battalion-sized contingent, the Purano Gorakh Battalion, was 
deployed in Egypt with UNEF II in 1974. Throughout the whole Panchayat period, the 
NA participated in six different peacekeeping missions. In addition to UNEF II and 
UNIFIL, in 1966 it participated in peacekeeping missions in India and Pakistan 
(UNIPOM), and in 1989 in Tajikistan (UNMOT) and Afghanistan and Pakistan 
(UNGOMAP I/II, OSGAP I/II/III as military observers) (Table 3).120 Nepalese 
peacekeepers have since made major contributions.121 Nepalese contingents have 
received appreciation from many force commanders and high-ranking officials for their 
commitment and professionalism.122  
Nepalese Army in Peace Support Operations 
 Mission Year 
1 UNIPOM, India/Pakistan (Military Observers)  1966 
2 UNEF II Sinai, Middle East (Peacekeeping Troops)  1974 
3 UNIFIL, Lebanon (Peacekeeping Troops)  1978 
4 UNMOT, Tajikistan 1989 
5 UNGOMAP I/II, OSGAP I/II/III (Military Observers)  1989 
Table 3.   NA's UN peacekeeping participation during the Panchyat period 
(1961-1989) 
                                                 
120 Bala Nanda Sharma, Lt Gen (Ret), "Peace-support Operations and Nepal: Past Experiences and 
Future Perspectives," in Pandey and Adhikari, eds, Nepalese Foreign Policy at the Crossroads, 151. 
121 Nepalese Army, The Nepalese Army in Peace Support Operations, (Kathmandu:  NADPKO, 
2008), DVD ROM. 
122 Maj Gen Claudio Giaziana, Force Commander, UNIFIL, maintains, "Nepal has shown a lot of 
professional capabilities. They are experienced peacekeepers and they are very much able to run what is in 
reality the core value of a peacekeeper, to show firmness when it is necessary to be firm, and to show 
humanity to the range of operations when there is a case to show a humanitarian attitude."  Similarly, Brig 
Gen Apurva Kumar Bardalai, Deputy Force Commander, UNIFIL, asserts, "In case of the Nepalese Army, 
they have done a commendable job, the way they have forged a damn good relation with the civilian 
population. They have been able to win the hearts and minds of the people and they have been able to 
create a situation where they have been found widely acceptable to the entire population of South Lebanon. 
And, therefore, the contributions of the Nepalese Army in bringing back peace and security in this 
disturbed region have been excellent." 
 57
From 1961 through 1971, King Mahendra played a key role in shaping and 
implementing foreign policy, seeking to achieve three main objectives: maximization, 
diversification and mobilization. He first tried to expand the playing field of foreign 
policy by exploiting the preferences and the clash of interests between India, China and 
other major powers. Then he sought to go beyond a limited reliance on a few resources. 
Finally, he utilized Nepal's active participation in international forums like UN and the 
Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) to pressure and mobilize regional and international 
powers in Nepal's favor. 123 
Nepal's Zone of Peace Proposal, based on Panchasheel, was a reflection of 
Nepal's aspiration to achieve and maintain its sovereignty, integrity and independence 
without interference from neighboring countries.124 A total of 116 countries supported 
the proposal, including four permanent members of the UN Security Council. The 
outcome of the internationalist approach was positive and significant. The election of 
Nepal as non-permanent member of the UN Security Council in 1969-70 and in 1988-89 
by an overwhelming majority was the result of Nepalese foreign policy, which 
emphasized Nepal's association with the United Nations' peace initiative.125 
To utilize peacekeeping participation as a tool to protect Nepal's sovereignty, the 
king dovetailed the army's peacekeeping efforts with country's foreign policy objectives, 
adopting an internationalist approach to foreign policy.126 This internationalist approach 
produced a synergic outcome by effectively utilizing the NA's peacekeeping participation 
to search for Nepal's space in international forums. The internationalism came to fruition 
when Nepal was chosen for important responsibilities in the UN. For instance, Nepal led 
                                                 
123 S. D. Muni, Foreign Policy of Nepal, (Delhi: National, 1973), quoted in Jitendra Dhoj Khand, 
"National Interest and Foreign Policy," Nepalese Foreign Policy at the Crossroads, ed. Sushil Raj Pandey 
and Pushpa Adhikari (Kathmandu: Sangam Institute, 2009), 104. 
124 At the 1973 summit of the Nonaligned Movement in Algiers, King Birendra stated that "Nepal, 
situated between two of the most populous countries of the world, wishes her frontiers to be declared a 
zone of peace." In Birendra's 1975 coronation address, he formally asked other countries to endorse his 
proposal. 
125 Jitendra Dhoj Khand, "National Interest and Foreign Policy," in Sushil Raj Pandey and Pushpa 
Adhikari, eds, Nepalese Foreign Policy at the Crossroads, (Kathmandu: Sangam Institute, 2009), 104. 
126  It seemed that the king also wanted to divert the military's attention away from internal party 
politics by engaging it in a new role. He gave the military a new role by involving it in international 
peacekeeping missions. 
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the Commission of Investigation into the Conditions and Circumstances resulting in the 
tragic death of then Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold, who was killed in a plane 
crash at Ndola in Lusaka in 1961.127 The internationalist approach also helped Nepal to 
become a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council in 1969–70 and 1988–89.  
Additionally, this approach helped Nepal to project its image to the international 
community and to maintain its sovereignty, independence and national integrity. 
3. The Second Democratic Period (1990–2005) 
After the establishment of multiparty democracy and constitutional monarchy in 
Nepal, there was a surge in NA participation in peacekeeping missions.128 The army 
participated in scores of missions.129 There are three reasons for NA's increased 
involvement in peacekeeping missions after 1990. First, immediately after the 
establishment of multiparty democracy in Nepal, the NA was free to send more 
peacekeepers because it no longer had to protect the king's regime. Second, the new 
political leaders did not find any role for the army in the new democratic environment, 
except engaging a small portion of the army in national development works. Finally, 
there were growing demands for peacekeepers in the international arena, as the third 
wave of democratization and end of the Cold War resulted in a sharp increase in conflicts 
around the world.130 
                                                 
127   Nepal and UN, Government of Nepal, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, website: http://www.mofa. 
gov.np/nepalun/ statement6.php, accessed 19 December 2009. 
128 According to the International Crisis Group Report No. 184, the number of Nepali military 
observers, police and troops deployed in peacekeeping operations was just under 1,000 from 2001 to 
September 2003. It nearly doubled in October and grew to over 2,200 in December 2003. It was 3,400 by 
the end of 2004, at which time Nepal was the fourth-largest troop contributing country overall (having been 
eleventh in 2001). It has stayed in fourth or fifth position since then and had approximately 4,300 people 
deployed in late 2009. 
129 The Nepalese Army in UN PKO, Nepalese Army's Website, http://www.nepalarmy.mil.np/ 
na_un.php, (accessed December 19, 2009). 
130 Barry R. Posen, "The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict" Survival, vol. 35, no. 1, Spring 1993, 
27-47, Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (Norman: 
University of Oklahoma Press, 1991). 
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During this period, the majority of NA troops were deployed in peace 
enforcement and multidimensional peacekeeping operations in which internal armed 
conflicts constituted the major problems.  
 
 
Table 4.   NA's UN peacekeeping participation during second democratic period 
(1990–2005) 
Nepalese Army in Peace Support Operations 
 Mission Year 
1 UNIKOM Kuwait/Iraq (Force Commander)  1991 
2 UNMIH, Haiti (Peacekeeping Troops)  1991 
3 UNTSO, Israel , Middle - East (Chief of Staff)  1992 
4 UNISOM, Somalia (Peacekeeping Troops)  1993 
5 UNPF/UNPROFOR, Former Yugoslavia (Peacekeeping Troops) 1994 
6 UNGCI, Iraq (Peacekeeping Troops)  1995 
7 UNTAES, Eastern Slovenia (Military Observers) 1996 
8 UNPREDEP, Macedonia (Military Observers)  1996 
9 UNOMIL, Liberia (Military Observers)  1996 
10 UNMOP, Prevalaka (Military Observers)  1998 
11 UNMIK, Kosovo (Military Observers) 1999 
12 UNOMSIL/UNAMSIL, Sierra Leone (Peacekeeping Troops) 1999 
13 MONUC, DR Congo (Peacekeeping Troops) 1999 
14 UNAMET/UNTAET/UNMISET, East Timor (Peacekeeping Troops)  1999 
15 UNFICYP, Cyprus (Force Commander)  1999 
16 UNMEE, Ethiopia/Eritrea (Military Observers)  2000 
17 MINUCI, Ivory Coast (Military Observers)  2003 
18 UNOCI , Ivory Coast (Military Observers)  2003 
19 UNMIL, Liberia (Peacekeeping Troops)  2003 
20 UNDOF, Israel/Syria (Force Commander & Staff)  2004 
21 MINUSTAH, Haiti (Peacekeeping Troops)  2004 
22 ONUB, Burundi (Peacekeeping Troops)  2004 
23 UNMIS, Sudan (Peacekeeping Troops)  2004 
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The establishment of a multiparty democratic system in Nepal was a result of the 
worldwide third wave of democratization. Other parts of the world saw similar political 
agitation, conflict and transformation. The Nepalese Army continued participating in UN 
peacekeeping missions. During this period, political instability on the African continent 
created a heavy demand for UN peacekeepers. Jayaraj Acharya, a Permanent 
Representative of Nepal to the UNHQ in 1991, says, 
Certainly, there was higher demand for peacekeeping operations around 
the world, particularly in former Yugoslavia, Haiti, and Somalia. And we 
did contribute Nepalese Soldiers...and their performances were highly 
appreciated by the world leaders, particularly by the ambassadors of 
permanent five members of the Security Council. I was told by them that 
the discipline, commitment and professionalism of the Nepalese soldiers 
in peacekeeping operations were highly appreciated by the force 
commanders, and they had got very good feedback and they told me that 
Nepal would be appreciated if it would remain on standby to contribute 
more soldiers to peacekeeping operations.131 
Nepal has taken part in peacekeeping missions in various conflict zones, and 
some of the NA’s high-ranking officers have filled key appointments in peacekeeping 
missions.132 Various force commanders and high-ranking officials who directly monitor 
and supervise international peacekeeping in the field say that the NA's mission 
performance is commendable.133 But, the democratic government did not formulate any 
new policy or vision for employing the army in peacekeeping missions, nor did it 
interfere the NA from continuing its peacekeeping responsibilities. Thus the 
internationalist approach became dormant. The NA's profound contribution to UN 
peacekeeping missions could not be utilized to support foreign policy objectives and 
                                                 
131 Nepalese Army, The Nepalese Army in Peace Support Operations, (Kathmandu:  NADPKO, 
2008), DVD ROM. 
132 Lt Gen (Ret.) Krishna Narayan Singh Thapa became Force Commander of UNIKOM mission in 
1993. Lt Gen (Ret.) Victory Shumsher Rana became Force Commander of UNFICYP in 1998-2000. Lt 
Gen Chitra Bahadur Gurung served as Military Advisor to the Secretary General of UN. Lt Gen Balananda 
Sharma served as Force Commander and the Head of UNDOF, the mission in Syria and the Golan Heights, 
in 2004-2006. Maj Gen Pawan Jung Thapa is currently serving as Force Commander of UNMIS.  
133  ONUB Force Commander, Major General Derrick Mbeiskele Megyobe, says, "Nepalese Army 
personnel have a very polite nature and they blend in the society. They have been honored because they are 
disciplined and fearless." He further notes that compared to the other forces, the presence of the Nepali 
Army had eased the environment. For more information see the Nepalese Army, The Nepalese Army in 
Peace Support Operations (Kathmandu:  NADPKO, 2008), DVD ROM. 
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national interests. The Ministry of Defense also kept a low profile.  Without a dedicated  
defense minister and without the Ministry playing an effective role in peacekeeping 
activities, peacekeeping remained the army’s private domain. This situation resulted in 
unstable CMR. 
When the Maoists launched an armed struggle against the government, the NA 
faced a challenge to continue participating in peacekeeping missions. However, with the 
gradual increase in the size of the NA after its involvement in counterinsurgency 
operations, participation in peacekeeping operations was no longer hindered. 
Nevertheless, CMR deteriorated. 
4. The Third Democratic Period (2006–2009) 
After the second people's movement, and following the establishment of a 
republic in Nepal, the NA has participated in new peacekeeping missions in Georgia 
(UNOMIG), Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT), Iraq (UNAMI) and 
Timor-Leste (UNMIT) (Table 5).134  
 
Nepalese Army in Peace Support Operations 
 Mission Year 
1 UNIFIL, Lebanon (Peacekeeping Troops)  2006 
2 UNOMIG, Georgia (Military Observers)  2007 
3 MINURCAT, Chad (Military Observers) 2008 
4 UNAMI, Iraq 2008 
5 UNMIT, Timor-Leste 2008 
Table 5.   NA's UN peacekeeping participation during third democratic period 
(2006–2009) 
There has been no change in Nepalese peacekeeping participation since the 
establishment of the republic system; however, Nepalese CMR has been very unstable in 
                                                 
134 Nepalese Army in UN PKO, Nepalese Army website, http://www.nepalarmy.mil.np/ na_un.php, 
(accessed December 19, 2009). 
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this period.135 Nepal faces various challenges in peacekeeping. Apart from logistical and 
management difficulties, allegations of human rights violations are also causing some 
problems.136 
Despite these CMR problems, peacekeeping participation continued. The interim 
government led by the Nepali Congress party, the Maoist-led government, and the CPN 
(UML) government all emphasized and praised the NA’s peacekeeping participation 
wholeheartedly. While there was emphasis on the NA’s participation in peacekeeping 
missions, there has been no attempt at involving civilians in peacekeeping activities. The 
government did not understood the problems of the Nepalese peacekeepers, nor did it 
provide necessary logistic support and political direction. When democratic institutions 
were in place, civilians seemed apathetic towards peacekeeping operations.  
D. ANALYSIS OF NEPALESE PEACEKEEPING PARTICIPATION 
Historically, Nepal's shift towards internalization was an effort to pursue foreign 
policy goals. The Nepalese Army’s peacekeeping participation was part and parcel of that 
effort. The UN has provided an important forum for smaller countries like Nepal to 
pursue its national interests and exercise foreign policy with dignity and sovereignty.137 It 
has also provided small countries with moral and physical security from aggression, 
interference, and encroachment.138  
                                                 
135 Hira Bahadur Thapa, "Nepal's Unique Participation in UNPKOs." He asserts, "In enhancing the 
international image of the country, Nepal's useful contributions to the UNPKOs have been crucial. It is a 
fact that Nepal is one of the rarest examples in the world that has continued to respond positively to the 
UN's calls for troops in whatever complex the deployment mission might be." 
136 The ICG Asia Report No 184, January 14, 2010. 
137 Bishwa Keshar Maskay, President, United Nations Associations of Nepal, Nepal and the United 
Nations: 1956-1996 (United Nations Associations of Nepal, 1996). Maskay asserts, "For a small landlocked 
state, the UN has not only struggled for its right of access to the sea, but also offered the choices in foreign 
policy matters. Freedom of choices is the hallmark of national independence, sovereignty and identity." He 
also writes, "For small states like Nepal, the UN has proved not only a sounding board but a last resort to 
articulate national aspirations. The legitimacy of the UN comes from its role performance, where Nepal in 
many ways is in a better position, especially in the area of peacekeeping."  
138 Mahendra Bir Bikram Shah, King of Nepal, Address to the 22nd Session of the UN General 
Assembly, New York, November 6, 1967. King Mahendra said, "For, to a small country as mine, the 
United Nations represents the ideal as well as the practical. It satisfies us in so far as it helps us to work 
actively for larger unity and for peace and prosperity of mankind; it satisfies us also in so far as it secures 
us morally and materially against encroachment and interference from others." 
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Nepal’s major engagement in UN peacekeeping operations came during the 
second democratic period, 1990–2005. This period was crucial for CMR in Nepal. Nepal 
started sending troops under the provision of Chapter VII of UN Charter, when its troops 
participated in peace enforcement mission in Somalia in 1993. 
The NA acquired some experience and professionalism by operating with other 
professional armies. In addition, working with civilians during peacekeeping missions 
has considerably altered its approach to problems. Himalaya Thapa asserts, "The 
experience and skills developed in various UN peacekeeping operations certainly helped 
the Nepalese Army to launch successful counterinsurgency operations, paving the way 
for a political solution in Nepal."139 The long involvement in peacekeeping missions 
changed the nature and working pattern of NA, which helps bring it closer to the civilian 
community.140 Nevertheless, other unintended consequences cannot be ruled out. 
Saubhagya Shah argues that Nepal's growing involvement in international peacekeeping 
needs to be read as a double-edged sword, as the NA is unavailable for defending the 
home front when needed. He asserts,  
While the UN peacekeeping missions to the far corners of the globe's 
hotspots has brought international visibility and recognition to Nepal's 
foreign policy based on peace and non-alignment, the time has perhaps 
come to reassess how such mission engagements impact its internal 
functioning and capability to defend the homeland.141  
From 1990 through the end of 2000, the NA was oriented towards international 
missions. It was a decade characterized by policy inconsistencies between the military’s 
internationalism and the government's internal orientation. The NA was solely focused on 
its international peacekeeping mission, while the political parties were entangled in 
                                                 
139 Himalaya Thapa, United Nations Peacekeeping Operations and Nepal's Participation (1958-2008): 
An Evaluation, Master's dissertation, The University of Westminster, Regent Campus, (Diplomatic 
Academy of London, 6 August, 2008). 
140 Morris Janowitz mentions that by working with civilians, the soldiers change and become more 
civilianized, their approaches to problem solving thereby becoming more like civilian approaches. 
Janowitz, The Professional soldier. 
141 Saubhagya Shah, "Democratization of Nepal Army: Establishing Civilian Supremacy," Conference 
Paper presented at Nepal Army Command and Staff College, Shivapuri, Kathmandu, 22–23 September 
2009. 
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domestic politics. There was a clear gap between the state's approach and the functioning 
of one of the instrument of national power, the military. At the strategic level, Nepal 
lacked a coherent policy that would allow it to institutionalize the experience gained in 
international missions. This is why, despite long and successful involvement in 
international missions and interactions with other professional armed forces, the NA 
could not become as professional as it should have been.  
In its many years of UN peacekeeping missions, Nepal has undergone through 
various experiences and evolution processes. The concept of peacekeeping missions 
emerged from the concept of collective security founded in the concept of collective 
defense that seeks to form alliances against any state that commits an act of aggression. 
During the Cold War, peacekeeping was limited to interposing troops between belligerent 
parties, supervising and verifying cease-fires, and observing, monitoring, and reporting. 
Peacekeeping duties were limited to maintaining the status quo, and emphasis was given 
on impartiality and minimum use of the force, in which neutral countries like Nepal, 
rather than the permanent members of the UN Security Council, played a crucial role.142 
These missions were mandated by Chapter VI of UN charter. Examples of such missions 
include UNEF I, UNEF II, UNYOM, UNIPOM, UNIMOG, UNTAG, UNAVEM I, and 
UNOMIG. Nepal contributed peacekeepers to missions under Chapter VI. The mere 
presence of blue helmets was enough to restrain the conflicting parties from further 
hostilities. Non-enforcement was the norm of traditional peacekeeping. Parties were 
deterred from relying on force; deployment of peacekeepers began after fighting halted; 
peacekeepers used to create buffers without seizing territory; and rather than taking 
territory, peacekeepers aimed to restore order or defend the territory. During those days 
national contingents did not have to make their own logistical arrangements, as the Wet 
Lease provision provided everything from toilet paper to tanks. Such arrangements made 
                                                 
142 During the Cold War period the United Nations’ permanent five (P-5) members did not send troops 
for peacekeeping missions because of the politicized and divided international context. This norm changed 
after the end of the Cold War, and P-5 members and middle powers started taking part in UN peacekeeping 
operations. Today, great powers tend to send their troops for peacekeeping missions under their own 
command rather than under the aegis of the UN.  Lise Morje Howard asserts, "The P-5 members of the 
Security Council tend not to be very good peacekeepers in large part because it is difficult for the great 
powers to remain impartial while developing field-level capacities for learning. Lise Morje Howard, UN 
Peacekeeping in Civil Wars (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 332. 
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UN peacekeeping participation less challenging to developing countries like Nepal. 
Government and armed forces’ peacekeeping responsibilities were limited to making 
political or operational decisions to participate in particular missions. The situation of 
CMR was not particularly challenging in the first generation peacekeeping missions.  
The nature of conflict changed with the end of the Cold War, requiring a new 
approach to peacekeeping missions and the advent of the second and third generations of 
peacekeeping missions.143 The new multidimensional peacekeeping operations focused 
on facilitating political processes; creating a secure and stable environment and 
strengthening state security apparatus; and providing a framework for ensuring that all 
UN and other actors pursue their activities with close civil and military cooperation as the 
key to success. Although Nepal participates in most of the multidimensional 
peacekeeping missions, the NA's Directorate of Peacekeeping’s stovepipe functioning 
has hindered the effectiveness and efficiency of the Nepalese peacekeeping effort. The 
lack of civilian participation in the Nepalese Army's peacekeeping efforts has impeded 
the most needed changes in the present context of multi-dimensional peacekeeping 
efforts.   
The government treats Nepalese peacekeeping participation as the sole 
prerogative of the NA, showing a lack of enthusiasm to control, coordinate and supervise 
these activities. The Ministry of Defense has not been competitive enough in managing 
peacekeeping efforts. The process of selecting, training, equipping, projecting and 
maintaining peacekeepers in conflict zones has not been effective.144 Many questions 
have been raised about transparency and proper management of welfare funds from 
within and outside of the institution. Although the NA has made efforts to make the 
welfare fund activities transparent and better managed, these efforts are seen inadequate 
                                                 
143 Michael W. Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis, Making War and Building Peace (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2006), 10. 
144 Suresh Hamal writes, "The process of selection, training and equipping must be executed strictly 
with stringent standards. To send soldiers below standard to participate in UN peacekeeping operations as a 
welfare scheme should be stopped. The best commanders and the best soldiers and technicians should only 
be permitted to be included in the mission."  Suresh Hamal, UN Peacekeeping Operation as an Instrument 
of National Policy, Master's thesis, Department of Strategic Studies, Tribhuvan University, January 2007, 
51. 
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for projecting a positive image of the army and enhancing the effectiveness and 
efficiency of Nepalese peacekeeping efforts. There are grievances regarding 
mismanagement in the procurement system and lack of transparency. These problems 
have caused a great setback in peacekeeping efforts by tarnishing the image of the NA.  
The inability to demonstrate the relative competence of civilian and military 
institutions has resulted in inadequate performances in diplomatic, as well as operational 
aspects of peacekeeping. Also, lacking a symbiotic relationship between the military and 
civilians with regard to peacekeeping involvement, foreign policy and security, Nepal has 
not been able to achieve maximum output. However, one of the reasons for this is lack of 
diplomatic effectiveness.145  
A clear example of this weakness is Nepal's inability to establish a regional 
peacekeeping center.  The intention of hosting the first regional peacekeeping exercise 
was to develop Panchkhal as South Asia’s Regional Peacekeeping Centre, according to 
statements reported during the exercise's launch.146 Despite its favorable environment 
and contributions to UN peacekeeping missions, Nepal could not cash in on the 
opportunity to establish a regional peacekeeping training center. Although there are many 
reasons for why the center did not materialize, Nepalese political apathy and inaction, 
and diplomatic incompetency are the primary causes of the failure to realize this national 
interest. 
Presently, BPOTC trains approximately 8000 peacekeepers annually prior to their 
deployment in various peacekeeping operations around the world. Its main tasks are pre-
deployment and specialized training. The UK government contributed for infrastructure 
development and other areas of the center, while United States support is focused on 
                                                 
145  Himalaya Thapa writes, "Despite following good principles and policies, Nepal's performance on 
the ground in terms of diplomacy has not been effective as it should have been." 43. 
146 Karniol, "Nepal Plays Host to World Peacekeeping Exercise," Jane's Defence Weekly, Vol. 033, 
Issue 5, 2 February, 2000. He writes, "The Nepal News reported that Nepalese Army Chief Gen Prajwalla 
Sumsher Rana proposed during his remarks launching the exercise that Nepal be declared the South Asian 
Regional Peacekeeping Center. The newspaper said that this initiative was supported by Commander-in-
Chief US Pacific Command Adm Dennis Blair and Assistant Secretary-General of the UN Peacekeeping 
Department, Yong Jin Choi, who were present at the ceremony." 
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capacity building programs for Nepalese peacekeepers.147 Similarly, Global Peace 
Operation Initiatives (GPOI) assistance contributes to the production of competent 
trainers and specialized training. In February 2009, BPOTC conducted a pilot of pre-
deployment training in close coordination with the Integrated Training Service (ITS) of 
the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO). The center, which aspires to 
expand its outreach to regional level, also provides training to students from friendly 
countries and contributes instructors to other school of instruction both at home and 
abroad.  
E. PEACEKEEPING, NEPAL, AND THE CONSTABULARY CONCEPT 
There are some important differences between a nation's soldiers and its 
peacekeepers.  Soldiers are always loyal to their nation, whereas peacekeepers are loyal 
to the international community. It has been seen that soldiers from some armed forces, 
especially from advanced countries, are reluctant to function under the command of a 
foreign army’s commander. This is mainly because developed countries do not give high 
allegiance to the UN, which is not the case with the peacekeepers from Nepal and some 
other developing countries dedicated to international peace and security.  
Peacekeeper militaries believe that peacekeepers' adherence to the principal of 
impartiality signifies their shift of allegiance from national parochial loyalty to a broader 
international loyalty.148 This shift in loyalty indicates their seriousness and dedication to 
the UN efforts for international peace. Apart from a broader international loyalty, there 
are other inherent qualities that which make a normal soldier a peacekeeper. Moskos 
writes, "The skills of the peacekeeping soldier require such traits as the avoidance of 
violence, quiescent monitoring, negotiation, and compromise."149 Many troop 
                                                 
147 The U.S. has an interest in the South Asian countries contributing to United Nations peacekeeping 
operations. Nepal, as one of the largest and most experienced contributors, received U.S. funding to 
conduct regional exercises under the Enhanced International Peacekeeping Capabilities Program (EIPCP).  
According to Jane's Defence Weekly, "Bangladesh and Nepal have emerged as pivots central to US efforts 
to promote peacekeeping activities in South Asia under its EPICP." Robert Karniol, "Asia Pacific, 
Bangladesh and Nepal to Support Peacekeeping Bid," Jane's Defence Weekly, Vol. 31, Issue 10, 10 March 
1999.  
148 Moskos, Peace Soldiers, 4. 
149 Moskos, Peace Soldiers, 9.  
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contributing nations try to inculcate these traits in their peacekeepers through training 
before sending them overseas. However, it takes time to mould conventionally trained 
soldiers for peacekeeping duties. The NA's participation in UN peacekeeping has over 
time inculcated such qualities in its members. Upon analysis, these qualities are 
consistent with the constabulary concept put forward by Morris Janowitz and later 
advocated by Moskos. 
Moskos argues that ad-hoc units and those with proportionately more officers 
tend to be more constabulary in nature compared with regular intact units with deep-
rooted traditions and esprit de corps. The regular intact units are more concerned with 
soldierly qualities like valor, aggressiveness, regimental prestige and loyalty towards the 
nation. Since civilianizing is one of the attributes of a constabulary, and peacekeeping 
contingents tend to become civilianized as they increase the ratio of officers to other 
ranks in their peacekeeping contingents, peacekeeping troops reflect the constabulary 
attitude.150 The NA deploys peacekeeping contingents by forming ad-hoc units for 
specific six-month UN tours, and demobilizes them after their tour of duty.  The NA's ad 
hoc units have more officers and Junior Commissioned Officers (Warrant Officers), 
resulting in a high ratio of officers to other ranks. The roles of Subedar Major (the most 
senior Warrant Officer) and Sergeant Majors (the most powerful figures in a regular unit) 
are less powerful in such ad-hoc units. If Moskos is right, over fifty years of such 
experiences may have inculcated a constabulary nature in the NA.   
Additionally, on the country's national day and other occasions, Nepalese 
contingents organize parades, cultural programs and sports competitions with the local 
people and other contingents, fostering cross-national contacts.151 Nepalese troops 
interact with civilian communities in a day-to-day basis while working together. The NA 
organizes Nepalese media reporters’ visits to mission areas to give them first hand 
                                                 
150 Moskos, Peace Soldiers, 59. 
151 Pyar Jung Thapa asserts, "The RNA troops serving in the UN peace keeping operation are exposed 
to different cultures and social environments through exchanges and meetings during ceremonies, parades, 
sporting events and their day to day dealings with locals." See "The UN Peace Keeping in the New World 
Order and the Role of Royal Nepal Army," Nepal's Participation in the United Nations Peacekeeping 
Operations: Report of the Round Table, edited by Bishwa Keshar Maskay and Dev Raj Dahal, (United 
Nations Association of Nepal, Institute of Foreign Affairs, 1995), 33.   
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information about Nepalese peacekeeping activities in the field. Thus, NA members are 
very close to civilians and work with them in completely new environments to establish 
good working relationships. This is challenging as well as stimulating. Taking part in UN 
peacekeeping missions is also an opportunity to be operational in the field. Before its 
involvement in counterinsurgency operations in Nepal in 2001, the NA had a very few 
opportunities to deploy its soldiers in the field to hone their skills.152 Similarly, a civilian 
Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) heads a UN peacekeeping 
mission. This propagates a culture of civilian supremacy among the contingents of troop 
contributing countries and may have influenced the NA as well. Many years of such 
interactions may have evolved a stable CMR between Nepalese peacekeepers and the 
civilian body of the UN. According to Moskos, "The form of civilian control over UN 
peacekeeping forces comes close to a pure model of objective control."153    
The performance of Nepalese peacekeepers reflects high standards, with strict 
adherence to the minimum use of force, impartiality, the Rules of Engagements (ROE), 
and human rights. Continued practice in peacekeeping missions has institutionalized a 
certain level of human rights standards in the NA.154 The minimum use of force, a tenet 
of UN peacekeeping operations, was emphasized during counterinsurgency operations 
and other internal security mobilizations in Nepal.155 However, there are allegations of 
human rights violations by Nepalese Army's personnel during mobilization in 
                                                 
152 Thapa, 33.  Pyar Jung Thapa says that the mission areas provide an opportunity for participating 
nations to hone their professional skills in war or conflict stricken environment which not be possible in the 
home countries in peace time. The RNA [Royal Nepalese Army: now called only Nepalese Army] has 
benefitted from this aspect because of its exposure especially in the sphere of modern weapons technology, 
communication systems, working procedures, as well as various experiences gained from low intensity 
conflict operations carried out in mission areas. 
153 Moskos, Peace Soldiers, 82. 
154 "The exposure to international peacekeeping has ensured that it remains one of the few 
organizations in Nepal where the teaching and practice of Human Rights has been long institutionalized. 
However, the army leadership needs to be more conscious and aware of rights violations being committed 
by servicemen as a result of error in individual judgment and action." Rahul Thapa, "Double Standard 
against the Men in Uniform," Nepalnews.com, web address:http://www.nepalnews.com/archive/2006/ 
others/guestcolumn/feb/guest_ columns_ feb06_09.php (accessed on 16 November 2009). 
155 Nirendra Prasad Aryal, JAG Brig, “Rules of Engagement,” Human Right Journal 2008, Nepalese 
Army, Kathmandu, 2008, 31. The NA’s Soldier's Card emphasizes the use of minimum force and also 
treating the enemies humanely, with respect and dignity. "Force" was generally defined as the use of 
physical means to impose the will of the Nepalese government during counterinsurgency operation against 
the Maoists insurgents, whereas it was the will of the United Nations' in peacekeeping operations.  
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counterinsurgency operations.156 Therefore, it is pertinent to analyze the NA's human 
rights violations during its counterinsurgency operations in Nepal vis-à-vis the excellent 
performance of the same soldiers in UN peacekeeping missions. Despite the emphasis on 
minimum use of force and human right protections, HR violations by NA members 
during counterinsurgency operations have been recorded. The puzzling question is what 
caused Nepalese soldiers with such fine records of accomplishment in the UN missions to 
perform so poorly in their own country. Was it purely a problem of NA soldiers, or was 
there something more? This is a puzzling question.157 Although some human right 
reports point to the chain of command and accountability, according to the NA such 
violations were individual mistakes on the part of NA members and were not policy 
driven and intentional.158 And the NA claims that it has "tried to minimize the grievances 
of the concerned and has taken adequate steps to ensure that violators are brought to 
justice."159 It is logical for the NA to be sensitive to human rights issues, not just because 
of its duty, but also to maintain its good image vis-à-vis UN peacekeeping. Major 
General Netra Bahadur Thapa, Adjutant General of NA, asserts, "The Nepalese Army has 
earned a very good reputation in UN Peace Keeping Operations and we do not want to  
 
                                                 
156 ICG, “Nepal: Peace and Justice,” Asia Report No. 184.  
157 A large number of reports with various conclusions have been published in this regard. It is 
noteworthy that the vast majority of the Maoist combatants were killed not only in an offensive operation 
by the Nepalese Army, but also in defensive retaliation to the Maoists’ attack on NA troops. Some cases of 
HR violations by members of the Nepalese Army have been seen as reprisals for attacks against their 
family members. Other cases of HR violations were as consequences of torture during interrogations. Apart 
from individual mistakes by Nepalese Army members, the defunct government intelligence apparatus also 
played a key role, resulting in improper interrogations by unskilled security forces that killed some 
detainees. Not recognizing the fact that "knowledge is power," the government did not invest a reasonable 
amount of funds and resources for intelligence. The weakness of intelligence gathering was also a serious 
flaw in security forces, including the Nepalese Army. Whether the long participation in UN peacekeeping 
operations led to a passive mentality of giving low priority to intelligence systems, a basic norm in the UN, 
could be a subject for further research. 
158 Rookmangud Katawal, General, Chief of the Army Staff of the Nepalese Army, Human Rights 
Journal 2008, Directorate of Human Rights, Army Headquarters, The Nepalese Army, Kathmandu, (2008). 
159 Dharma Bahadur Baniya, "History of the Human Rights Organizations of the Nepalese Army," 
Human Rights Journal 2008, Director of Human Rights, the Nepalese Army, Kathmandu, 2008, 1. 
According to him, the NA has punished 14 personnel found guilty of violating human rights while 
participating in UN missions over 50 years (the percentage of violators amounts to 0.02). It has punished 67 
personnel found guilty of violating human rights during security operations in Nepal. 
 71
tarnish that at home."160 Whatever the justifications, there should be no protection or 
impunity for human right violations. This is where civilian control is relevant, and where 
accountability and responsibility come into play. 
The reality is that the overall nature of the NA has gradually changed over the 
half century of its participation in UN peacekeeping missions. The emergence of 
constabulary ethics indicates that Nepal is slowly departing from its traditional military 
posture. The behavioral adherence to the minimum use of force, and this becoming 
universal as well as normative in the entire military institution, indicates a shift in the 
NA's character.161 The attitudinal change among Nepalese peacekeepers varies with 
individuals’ personality and field experiences. The change is more evident in officers 
who take part in UN peacekeeping missions more than once and who are highly 
intermingled with civilians. On the other hand, some allegations of HR violations and 
excessive use of force by the NA during counterinsurgency operations indicate the 
paradoxical development of a constabulary ethic among Nepalese soldiers. Establishing 
the causes of this problem is a matter for further research. 
F. FOREIGN POLICY ASPECTS 
The Interim Constitution of Nepal (2007) states, "the Foreign Policy of Nepal 
shall be guided by the principles of UN Charter, nonalignment, the Panchasheel, 
International law and the norms of world peace."162 The previous Nepalese constitution, 
the Constitution of the Kingdom of Nepal (1990), also states that the UN Charter shall be 
one of the five guiding principles of Nepalese foreign policy.163 The Ministry of Foreign 
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Affairs claims that Nepal has consistently supported  UN efforts to maintain peace and 
security by its continued participation in the UN.164 
The success of the Nepal’s previous foreign policy came from its continuous 
active engagement in UN peace initiatives that started with its first peacekeeping mission 
in 1958.165 Nepal had some tangible results from its successful foreign policy during 
1970s and 1980s. For instance, 116 countries, including four permanent members of the 
UN Security Council, supported Nepal's zone of peace proposal, which was based on five 
principles of peaceful coexistence, Panchasheel, and aimed at maintaining national 
sovereignty and independence. As another example, Nepal was elected as a non-
permanent Security Council member in 1969–70 and 1988–89 with overwhelming 
majorities.166 
Nepal's peacekeeping participation and foreign policy did not continue to parallel 
one another after the establishment of democracy in 1990.167 Before, Nepal had an 
"equidistance" or "equiproximity" policy regarding its two giant neighbors India and 
China.  At the same time, Nepal supported internationalism to maintain national identity. 
The NA's peacekeeping participation dovetailed with an internationalist approach to 
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foreign policy. However, after the establishment of the democratic system, the country's 
leaders ignored the internationalist aspect of foreign policy. In principle they keep 
pursuing an equidistance foreign policy, but in reality, they relied mostly on India. There 
are many reasons for the digressed foreign policy practice. One of the main reasons is  
political instability and the short life of regimes in Nepal. The political parties were 
always focused on making and breaking the government, and almost all the sectors were 
politicized. Huntington writes, 
In all societies, specialized social groups engage in politics. What makes 
such groups seem more "politicized" in a praetorian society is the absence 
of effective political institutions capable of mediating, refining, and 
moderating group political action. In a praetorian system, social forces 
confront each other nakedly; no political institutions, no corps of 
professional political leaders are recognized or accepted as the legitimate 
intermediaries to moderate group conflict.168 
Since political attention to the internationalist approach was not sufficient, the 
NA's participation in UN peacekeeping missions continued without meaningful political-
diplomatic congruity.169 This resulted in diplomatic setbacks. For instance, by 
eliminating Nepal, Indonesia was elected as the UN Security Council's non-permanent 
member for a two years term starting in January 2007.170 There could be many reasons 
for this failure including the weakening of Nepali diplomacy on various fronts. However, 
some posit that it also points to the ineffectiveness of recent Nepalese peacekeeping 
initiatives. Chiran Thapa writes, "Despite Nepal's contribution to numerous UN led peace 
operations, the rejection of Nepal's candidacy by an overwhelming majority at the 
General Assembly clearly suggests that the international community deems Nepal as less 
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capable of serving global security interests."171 In the face of Nepal’s widely lauded 
participation in peacekeeping, why Nepal is unsuccessful in international forums is a 
serious issue. 
G. CONCLUSION 
Over fifty years, the NA's participation in UN peacekeeping has been remarkable. 
Although Nepal's first democratic period was full of chaos, the political forces in the 
country realized the necessity of taking an internationalist approach. Therefore, this 
period was a watershed in Nepal's peacekeeping participation as well as its approach to 
foreign policy. The Panchayat period was an extension and consolidation of the same 
policies with enhanced participation. The positive outcome of the peacekeeping effort 
was seen during the 1970s and 1980s. After the reestablishment of democracy in 1990, 
Nepalese peacekeeping efforts increased tremendously, but foreign policy did not go 
along the peacekeeping contribution. Despite some shortcomings, Nepal's performance in 
peacekeeping missions has been very successful and widely acclaimed. Nepal could have 
benefitted highly, both diplomatically and politically, but it did not. Yet Nepal's 
peacekeeping participation has continued since the republic was established. Despite 
many political ups and downs and changes in political system, there is no difference in 
opinion in Nepal about its participation in peacekeeping operations. This clearly indicates 
that there is a consensus among the Nepalese political parties that peacekeeping 
participation contributes to Nepal's vital interests.   
Participation in peacekeeping missions can have effects at the individual level that 
can ultimately influence military institutions. There are different possibilities regarding 
the nature of civilian control exerted upon the peacekeeping contingents. On the one 
hand, peacekeeping participation exerts objective control of the military because of more 
autonomy and professional freedom, and the interaction with foreign militaries.172 On the  
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other hand, the social interactions with civilian components of missions as well as with 
the local population erode the military tenets of individual soldiers, making them more 
civilianized.173 
Different types of missions affect civilianization or professionalization trends 
differently. Multidimensional peacekeeping operations, in which much of the mission 
consists of civilian activities, tend to civilianize a soldier. Peace enforcement operations 
are less likely to exert civilianizing effects. If peacekeepers interact with forces from 
countries that have civilian control, such as the U.S. or the U.K., then the soldiers are 
more likely to emulate their professional behaviors. On the other hand, if they are 
exposed to inferior or less professional armed forces, then soldiers are unlikely to acquire 
professional knowledge. 
The nature of Nepalese CMR has various shades, and single theoretical lens 
cannot explain it in a holistic manner. Especially since the establishment of multiparty 
democracy in 1990, CMR has not been stable in the Nepalese case. On the face of it, the 
argument that countries with externally oriented military institutions tend to have stable 
CMR does not seem to fit in the Nepalese case. Despite civilianization of the military and 
the development of a constabulary attitude, stable CMR did not seem to occur in the 
Nepalese scenario. Another argument, positing that peacekeeping tends to cultivate 
objective civilian control, also does not seem to fit in the Nepalese case. However, in the 
Nepalese case, peacekeeping participation has engraved various attributes of objective 
civilian control such as professionalism and autonomy.  At the same time, peacekeeping 
participation has been civilianizing and has developed the constabulary attitudes 
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described by Moskos in the Nepalese peacekeepers.174 For instance, the Nepalese Army 
put an emphasis on minimum use of force and sought political rather than military 
solutions, during counterinsurgency operations in Nepal. The Nepalese Army's 
uninterrupted participation in peacekeeping missions during two major political 
revolutions in 1990 and 2006, and during its active involvement in counterinsurgency 
operations, indicate that the NA has been transforming into a "peacekeeper" military as 
described by Paul Shemella. 
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IV. A COMPARATIVE CASE STUDY OF ARGENTINE AND 
NEPALESE PEACEKEEPING AND IMPACTS ON CMR 
The Argentine case is cited as an excellent example of how peacekeeping can 
impact CMR in a positive way. The Argentine case also shows how a dovetailed military 
and political internationalist approach enhances foreign policy goals and changes the 
deep-seated interventionist attitude of the military. This case is comparable with the 
Nepalese scenario in many respects, and especially in regard to political history and 
peacekeeping activities. Both countries are geographically isolated and had a history of 
military involvement in politics. The comparison between the two is plausible because 
both started taking part in UN peacekeeping missions in 1958 and increased their 
peacekeeping participation after the end of the Cold War. Both countries adopted 
internationalist approaches, and both had good cooperation with the U.S. in peacekeeping 
activities. Both countries mobilized their armed forces for major military operations 
before a drastic change in the political system, and both suffered a negative image of the 
military in their post-democracy periods. Overall, both countries had intense civil-
military tensions during a post conflict situation. There are some significant differences 
between the two countries as well. Their geographical proximity, size, and social, cultural 
and economic conditions are different. In addition, Argentina is a regional power, and 
had lost a war against the United Kingdom in 1982, which is not the case for Nepal. This 
chapter analyzes the similarities and differences between the Argentine and the Nepalese 
peacekeeping participations in five key areas: dovetailing civilian and military 
internationalism, civilian involvement in peacekeeping activities, providing new roles for 
the military, the role of the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and 
the outcomes of peacekeeping participations. 
A. DOVETAILING CIVILIAN AND MILITARY INTERNATIONALISM 
After the establishment of democracy in 1983, the Argentine government adopted 
a new approach to foreign relations and national security. In this approach, the new 
government maintained a highly active presence in the international arena while the 
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military was involved in UN peacekeeping missions. Norden says, "With respect to the 
government, UN participation fits neatly into the overall internationalist political 
orientation; for the military, interest stems from more institutional and professional 
concerns."175  
Like Nepal, Argentina started sending military observers to Lebanon in 1958. Its 
peacekeeping activities began expanding in 1990 when its second democratic president, 
Carlos Menem adopted an internationalist approach. He encouraged the armed forces to 
take part in peacekeeping missions all over the world and to assume a new professional 
role. This approach perfectly suited the armed forces, as they also sought a new role was 
after their 1982 defeat by the U.K. The president carefully chose a highly qualified 
defense minister with expertise in foreign policy, the UN system and the military.176 The 
success of Argentina's internationalist approach and its establishment of stable CMR 
show that a very capable, mature and influential minister is required in the Ministry of 
Defense. Norden says, "Argentina's military became increasingly oriented towards 
international missions, both in terms of leadership (especially the Minister of Defense) 
and with respect to actual participation."177 Menem integrated foreign policy, security 
and economic policy to produce a synergic effect; the military contributed tremendously 
to his internationalist approach. The nature of CMR in Argentina since the establishment 
of democracy and Menem's adoption of internationalist approach can be termed very 
stable. The president took a keen interest in the army and established intimate relations 
with it. At the same time he had a broad national interest in taking leadership of the 
military. 
Nepal's peacekeeping participation increased tremendously after 1990, but 
political leaders and the Ministry of Defense did not pay much attention to NA's 
peacekeeping efforts, considering them as purely military missions. Not one single 
democratic government adopted an internationalist approach to peacekeeping to make it 
                                                 
175 Deborah L. Norden, "Keeping the Peace, Outside and In: Argentina's UN Missions," International 
Peacekeeping, Vol. 2, No.3 (Autumn 1995), 331. 
176 Norden, Keeping the Peace Outside and In, 333. 
177 Norden, Keeping the Peace Outside and In, 333. 
 79
commensurate with foreign policy; nor did they discard peacekeeping. The NA continued 
to participate in peacekeeping, but without tangible political or diplomatic involvement. 
In Nepal, unlike Argentina, peacekeeping participation and foreign policy were never in 
tune with each other during the entire democratic period. The lack of political guidance 
and direction made diplomacy weak.178 The NA was under the dual command of the 
government and the king and had a poor image among civilians. The army was kept aloof 
from the country's democratic framework until the Maoists made governance untenable 
by their armed movement. During the democratic period, almost all governments were 
focused on narrow interests rather than on redefining foreign policy, security and 
economic policies. 
B. CIVILIAN INVOLVEMENT IN PEACEKEEPING ACTIVITIES 
Argentina's peacekeeping participation has other important implications for CMR. 
The coordinated efforts of the Ministry of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff for peace 
operations improved CMR and civilian control of the military. Because of its external 
orientation, the military structure and organization were modified, and the decision-
making process, procurement and recruitment policies were transformed. Civilian 
participation in Argentina's Joint Peace Operation Training Center (CAECOPAZ), as 
instructors and as students, helped to promote CMR. Politicians, diplomats, and 
psychologists taught subjects such as International Humanitarian Law, International Law, 
and Psychology. Increasing the involvement of civilians in peacekeeping activities 
resulted in establishing institutional and legal frameworks that reduced military 
prerogatives. This strengthened CMR. If civilians were not involved in peacekeeping 
activities, the environment would be conducive for greater military autonomy and 
reserved domain, which would result in bad CMR.179 
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Compared to Argentina, the Nepalese face impediments in using their 
peacekeeping participation for good CMR. There is a lack of meaningful coordination 
and cooperation between the army and the Ministry of Defense, which resulted in low 
foreign policy achievement and inadequate performance in peacekeeping operations. 
Nepal’s military structure and organization have not been modified to keep pace with the 
changing international environment. Decision-making, selection, training, deployment 
and procurement policies have not been as efficient and transparent as they should be. 
Although significant number of civilians, foreign military personnel and international 
organizations' personnel are invited to the BPOTC, the quantity and quality of civilian 
involvement are not sufficient to improve CMR. Few politicians, diplomats, professors, 
lawyers, and peace experts are involved in peacekeeping instruction, seminars, 
discussions, research and strategy formulation. Hardly any publications relating to 
peacekeeping activities are generated within or outside of the NA. Civilian professors and 
educators are not incorporated into the framework for peacekeeping instruction. There is 
lack of coordination, cooperation and knowledge sharing among the NA, Nepal police 
and the armed police force. Because of this, Nepal lacks a concrete strategy for 
participating in future peacekeeping missions as well as best practices and lessons 
learned.   
C. PROVIDING NEW ROLES FOR THE MILITARY 
With the end of the Cold War, the role of international organizations has 
increased, and the UN especially has become a key player in resolving anarchy and 
conflict in various parts of the world. The transformation of the world order forced many 
militaries to redefine the nature of potential threats and the purpose of their organizations. 
With regime changes, many military institutions have faced serious challenges to their 
identities, causing serious civil-military problems. Norden believes that taking part in 
international peacekeeping missions can help to relieve such tensions.180 She suggests 
that Argentina's international peacekeeping approach helped to diffuse a serious civil-
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military crisis in its post-democracy period. This approach helped to change the military's 
embittered relationship with political leaders and its interventionist attitudes. 
The Nepalese post-conflict situation is comparable to Argentina's post conflict 
situation under the rule of its first democratic president, Raul Alfonsin. After coming into 
power, Alfonsin confronted the military head on while trying to establish democratic 
regime. Norden notes that he cut the military budgets "to the point that soldiers trained 
without bullets and pilots without fuel."181 Sotomayor says, "The re-democratization 
process of Argentina left the military without a role and in a moribund state, as civilians 
drastically cut budgets and closed military industries."182 Immediately after taking office, 
Alfonsin ordered the prosecution of military personnel in the courts for violations of 
human rights. According to Norden,  
Within the armed forces, frustration brewed. Already in disarray from the 
disastrous Falklands/Malvinas conflict, the military now found more 
enmity than leadership in the newly elected democratic government. It 
was a time when many within the armed forces would have eagerly 
embraced an opportunity for apolitical professionalism, yet 
professionalization was not offered as an option. Instead, the government 
directed its efforts towards demilitarization—weakening the armed forces, 
rather than redirecting them.183   
When civil-military tension was at its height, Menem's farsighted vision changed 
the whole situation into a win-win strategy. He created a new role for the military by 
reshaping Argentina's position within the international community and pursued a liberal 
economic plan by extensive privatization. In this new vision, economic and foreign 
policies were intricately linked, with emphasis on cooperative security, diplomacy and 
trade. The previous narrow emphasis on national sovereignty and competition was seen 
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established good relations with the United States. As Norden writes, "Argentina's new 
internationalism, from economic policy to peacekeeping, has been inseparable from the 
country's new allegiance to the United States."184 
D. THE ROLE OF THE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE AND THE MINISTRY OF 
FOREIGN AFFAIRS 
The Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs play an important 
role in promoting stable CMR by engaging in international organizations like the UN 
when the military participates in international missions. The active engagement of 
civilians in the UN helps to establish good relations with mission heads, allowing 
civilians to intervene in military affairs. However, the mere fact of civilian intervention 
may not exert positive effects on CMR. A mature and well thought out intervention is 
likely to have positive effects. In the Argentine case, there was a positive impact because 
of the two-level strategy, domestic and international, adopted by the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs. At the domestic level, the political strategy was to send maximum military 
personnel on peacekeeping missions so that the military would be busy on international 
missions and remain out of domestic politics. At the international level, Menem pursued 
the internationalist foreign policy extensively in order to fulfill national interests. These 
two strategies converged, supporting each other. This also transferred the decision 
making authority of peacekeeping from the military to civilians, thereby allowing civilian 
control of the military. However, it is worth noting that civilian intervention took place in 
Argentina only after Argentina was defeated in the Falklands War. The reorientation of 
Argentina’s foreign policy and approach to security generated public debate among 
scholars, policy makers and think tanks, which created more civilian expertise in defense 
policy and contributed to improved CMR. It also led to increased publication by 
journalists and scholars on peacekeeping issues.185 
Peacekeeping participation requires equipment and a considerable investment. 
With a budget allocation just large enough to pay for salaries, the Nepalese government 
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has barely invested in enhancing the professionalism of the army. This has a severe 
impact on the NA's professionalism and performance in peacekeeping missions. 
Although NA personnel gained personal benefits and some professional experience on an 
individual basis, the lack of necessary logistics, including equipment and weaponry, 
prevent the institution from instilling needed professionalism.  
The Argentinean government acquired resources for enhancing peacekeeping 
participation through various means. Commensurate with the internationalist approach, 
Argentina took measures such as appropriate training and an emphasis on the English 
language for peacekeepers. The Ministry of Defense submitted a proposal to the UN in an 
effort to establish a multinational training camp in Argentina. Argentina also created a 
standby force for peacekeeping missions. However, Menem restructured the military 
while reforming and reconstructing peacekeeping activities.    
Although the NA increased its peacekeeping participation after 1990, it could not 
increase its logistics capability because of the government's stringent control of the 
budget. The NA tried to supply logistics from its own private welfare fund created with 
contributions from soldier's peacekeeping allowances.186 To make its peacekeepers 
competent and efficient, the NA established the Birendra Peace Operation Training 
Center, and hopes to develop the facility into "a full-fledged center of excellence" and 
possibly a regional center. 187 Because the government has not assumed significant 
political and diplomatic roles, NA's endeavor to make the BPOTC a regional level 
peacekeeping training center is less likely.  
E. THE OUTCOMES OF PEACEKEEPING PARTICIPATIONS 
Despite the problem of finding financing for peacekeeping, Argentina gained 
significantly from its political investment. Its internationalist policy helped in debt 
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negotiations and created a more credible image of the government. Its internationalist 
policy also helped Argentina to play an important role in the international arena, fulfilling 
its national interests, while the military enjoyed the benefits of acquiring modern 
equipment and other logistics. In contrast, despite its army’s highly regarded participation 
in peacekeeping, Nepal could not take advantage of peacekeeping to advance its national 
interest because of the lack of government interest and the dilemma it faces in foreign 
policy.188 
Participation in peacekeeping missions by the Argentinean armed forces provided 
tangible benefits at the individual and institutional levels. Individual participants enjoyed 
an opportunity to travel, professional enhancement and monetary benefits. The institution 
also benefitted by increased professionalism among their soldiers with relatively less 
investment. According to Norden, "Argentina's relative geographical isolation, the 
military's lack of professional experience, the constrained economic conditions and the 
armed forces' pressing need to improve their image all contribute to a higher level of 
receptivity to international peacekeeping."189  
Despite the high emphasis on international peacekeeping missions, the military's 
primary role is to defend the country from internal and external threats. Peacekeeping 
missions remain the second highest priority. Over time, the concept of national security 
has been transformed and international security has been superimposed on domestic 
security. However, the Argentinean military still holds that national defense cannot be 
risked in the interest of cooperative security, and the nation-state continues to be the basic 
subject of international negotiation.  
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While peacekeeping missions have played an important role in promoting CMR 
in many instances, they have not always strengthened CMR. Sotomayor notes, "Different 
levels of military prerogatives have varying consequences when they interact with 
variables such as participation in peace operations."190 The quality and quantity of 
military prerogatives and reserve domain plays an important role in determining CMR, as 
"Involvement in peace operations is likely to improve civilian control in democratizing 
countries that have low levels of military prerogatives."191 Checks and balances, 
transparency and strong sense of accountability from both the military and civilian sides 
are necessary to avoid unintended and negative consequences for civilian control. 
According to Sotomayor, "Participation in peace operations can have unintended and 
even negative consequences for civilian control, unless Foreign Ministry and civilian 
bureaucrats assume a very active role in the decision-making process regarding peace 
deployments."192 Additionally, Sotomayor also argues that involvement in peacekeeping 
operations required a large investment of resources in Argentina, which corrupted top 
civilian decision makers.  
F. CONCLUSION 
The comparative study of the Argentinean and Nepalese cases shows that mere 
participation in peacekeeping missions does not promote stable CMR. Both countries 
have participated extensively in peacekeeping missions, especially since the end of the 
Cold War. Not only were there similar levels of peacekeeping participation, but both 
countries also experienced the process of democratization. However, there was a sharp 
difference in one respect: Nepalese political leaders were not involved in peacekeeping 
activities, while the Argentinean political leadership was deeply involved in decision 
making about peacekeeping activities and policies to dovetail peacekeeping with 
Argentina’s foreign policy goals. By participating in peacekeeping missions, Argentina 
became a successful example of both stable CMR as well as foreign policy goal 
                                                 
190 Sotomayor, Unintended Consequences of Peace Operations, 179 
191 Sotomayor, Unintended Consequences of Peace Operations, 180. 
192 Sotomayor, Unintended Consequences of Peace Operations, 183. 
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achievement.  In contrast, because of lack of political leadership, Nepal could not utilize 
its contribution to peacekeeping missions to realize its foreign policy goals or to achieve 
stable CMR. Unlike Argentina, Nepal has not been successful in dovetailing its foreign 
policy with peacekeeping operations by adopting an internationalist approach and 




This thesis focuses on Nepal’s historical contribution to UN peacekeeping 
missions and identifies an empirical puzzle: even while Nepal supports UN peace efforts 
with large peacekeeping deployments, it suffers from unstable civil-military relations at 
home.  This finding is counterintuitive because the conventional wisdom in CMR argues 
that participation in international peacekeeping operations promotes stable CMR by 
making young soldiers more cosmopolitan, less nationalistic, and more resistant to calls 
for military “salvation” via coups in times of crisis. Why does Nepal suffer from constant 
civil-military crises if the armed forces have a well-defined external mission to perform? 
Why has participation in peacekeeping operations not exercised a larger positive effect on 
Nepal’s CMR? 
To answer these questions this study first analyzed Nepal’s political history and 
evolution in terms of civil-military relations.  The analysis in Chapter II indicates that the 
armed forces have had a dynamic and at times quite unstable relationship with their 
fellow civilians.  After the establishment of a constitutional monarchy and a multiparty 
democratic system, the Army enjoyed a certain level of autonomy due to the balance of 
power between the king and the government. During this period the armed forces also 
underwent professionalization in the form of military instruction, education and training. 
To some extent, peacekeeping contributed to these efforts, as UN demands created 
domestic pressures for larger and more professional forces.   
Nevertheless, the latter half of second democratization period, which took place 
from mid 1990s to 2005, saw an increased sense of uncertainty and reinforced feelings of 
mutual distrust among political actors and the armed forces.  By the 1990s, CMR in 
Nepal had deteriorated, a result of the conflict between the king, Nepal’s traditional 
supreme commander, and the emerging political parties. Although the military enjoyed 
professional autonomy, the nebulous provision in the new constitution regarding the 
control of the military led to political chaos, especially in the face of internal threats like 
the Maoist insurgent movement. The Maoists, with whom the Army had fought a bitter 
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military campaign, subsequently came to power, generating even more mutual distrust 
between civilians and the military. Political instability in Nepal generated two negative 
dynamics in CMR: it politicized the armed forces, and most political parties tried to 
subjugate the military to their own political interests, leading to a fragile system of 
subjective civilian control. 
Consequently, CMR in Nepal have been subject to dynamic and dramatic changes 
in the past two decades. Ironically, throughout this time of political turmoil, Nepal 
continued to contribute to UN peace efforts with peacekeeping troops. In fact, Nepal’s 
peacekeeping participation increased in the 1990s, precisely when the country was facing 
its most severe domestic problems. There is substantial evidence that the military 
benefited both professionally and economically from its international experience.  
However, the country did not gain concrete diplomatic benefits from its international 
contributions. In fact, Nepal’s regional neighbors, India, Pakistan and Bangladesh, often 
get far more international credit than Nepal for their peacekeeping contributions.        
Furthermore, Nepal’s large peacekeeping deployments during the 1990s did not 
seem to help de-escalate the emerging crisis in CMR.  Although a military coup did not 
take place, there was rampant speculation of a military rebellion by armed forces 
dissatisfied with the civilian government.  Why was there political instability in Nepal at 
a time when its armed forces were deployed abroad in UN peacekeeping missions? 
A close look at Nepal’s political evolution indicates that political instability had 
an effect on CMR, as state institutions, whether the King or Parliament, were unable to 
exert civilian control during times of political transition. At the same time, civilians share 
the blame. They turned their backs on the conduct of military operations, including 
peacekeeping, because of their lack of expertise and inability to trust in their own 
judgments.  To some extent, lack of civilian interest in defense matters has eroded CMR, 
too.  
Consequently, the evidence presented here seems to support, at least in principle, 
the argument developed by Michael C. Desch in Civilian Control of the Military. In 
Desch’s view, “states that face primarily internal threats are likely to have inattentive 
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civilian leaders working through weak and divided institutions. The civilian leadership is 
likely to adopt subjective control mechanisms, and the military is likely to be highly 
unified but internally focused.”193   
Paradoxically, the Nepalese case also shows that one of Desch’s policy 
recommendations for countries facing internal threats, participation in peacekeeping, is 
unlikely to resolve crises in CMR in all transitional societies. In his book, Desch argues 
that “the Argentine government, in an effort to keep the country’s once internally 
oriented military externally focused, has recently been having the military participate in 
international peacekeeping missions. This is a realistic and beneficial post-Cold War 
military mission.”194 As analyzed in Chapter IV, the conditions that made Argentina so 
successful in pacifying the military through peacekeeping are not present in Nepal today. 
Civilians are not actively involved in peacekeeping strategic decisions, so they often 
delegate such operations to the military, thus increasing the military’s institutional 
autonomy.  In such scenarios, peacekeeping is merely a military mission dominated by 
the armed forces with no clear civil intervention or foreign policy goals.    
Although peacekeeping participation tends to promote objective civilian control, 
the nature of civilian control in the troops contributing countries depends heavily on the 
nature of domestic political involvement and interest in military matters. Peacekeeping 
contributes to civilianizing the military through interactions between the armed forces 
and diverse civilian communities in the field. Indeed, the military is more likely to 
become civilianized through interactions with civilian staff members, including non-
governmental organizations, UN civil personnel and diplomats. However, these 
interactions will not prevent a CMR crisis when there is political instability at home.  As 
this study shows, despite its involvement in peacekeeping, the military is likely to 
intervene in domestic politics when the country suffers from political turmoil and internal 
threats such as insurgency.   
                                                 
193 Desch, Civilian Control of the Military, 119.  
194 Desch, Civilian Control of the Military, 130. 
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Given this analysis, what can countries like Nepal do to improve its CMR while it 
contributes to peacekeeping? This study provides at least three policy recommendations 
for countries facing CMR challenges in times of political transition. First, it seems 
imperative to develop programs targeted towards civilian education in defense matters, 
enabling civilian leaders to become more knowledgeable about military issues and thus 
more capable of making informed policy decisions.  Second, since peacekeeping is an 
external mission, diplomats and bureaucrats in the Foreign and Defense Ministries should 
be more heavily involved in the decision-making process regarding peace operations.  
This can allow for more civilian integration in the decision making process, while also 
contributing to improving relations between civilian and military staff members.  
Likewise, this can assist in identifying clearer foreign policy goals when Nepal 
contributes to peacekeeping operations. Finally, the military has to come to terms with 
democracy and engage in profound organizational reform that includes more 
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